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Article 4

The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith:
Under Construction, But Not Yet Open
Douglas R. Richmond

I. INTRODUCTION
All contracts include an implied promise of good faith and fair
dealing.' Insurance policies, like all other contracts, contain this
implied promise or covenant, usually described as a duty. The
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing fundamentally requires that
neither party to a contract do anything that will injure the other's right
to receive the benefit of their agreement.' In the insurance context,
then, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a two-way street, open
to travel by insureds and insurers alike. Just as the duty prevents an
insurer from taking advantage of its insureds, so too should it prevent
insureds from acting unreasonably to their insurers' ultimate
detriment. 4 In reality, however, the two-way street does not always
seem to exist.
Insurance companies are continuously pounded in bad faith cases.
In 1996, for example, a Utah jury awarded the plaintiffs in a bad faith
* Partner, Armstrong Teasdale, Schlafly & Davis, Kansas City, Missouri. B.S.
1980, Fort Hays State University; M.Ed. 1981, University of Nebraska; J.D. 1988,
University of Kansas.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Mazur v. Hunt, 592 N.E.2d 335, 337 (II!. App. Ct. 1992); Pavia v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 27 (N.Y. 1993); Swanson v. Sioux Valley
Empire Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 535 N.W.2d 755, 758 (S.D. 1995); Austin Co. v. Royal Ins.
Co., 842 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Levine v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am.,
462 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Va. 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813,
825 (Wyo. 1994).
3. See, e.g., Burkons v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., 813 P.2d 710, 720 (Ariz. 1991);
Hightower v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 353 (Ct. App. 1995); Habetz v.
Condon, 618 A.2d 501, 505 (Conn. 1992); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872
P.2d 852, 856 (N.M. 1994); Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp., 635 A.2d
1211, 1216 (Vt. 1993).
4. See, e.g., Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp.
1403 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 85 F.3d 1088 (3d Cir. 1996). In Greater New York, the
court expressly recognized that the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in
insurance policies is reciprocal. Id. at 1408. Without reaching any conclusion about
whether the insured breached the duty in the case at bar, the Greater New York court
generally observed that "a]n insured should not have license to act in bad faith toward
its insurer." Id.
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action $145 million in punitive damages.5 In 1995, a Los Angeles jury
returned an $86,700,000 bad faith verdict in a property damage case,
including punitive damages of $57,800,000.6 Another California jury
awarded an insured $20,478,000, including $20,000,000 in punitive
damages.7 In 1994, a California jury returned a $7,150,000 bad faith
verdict, including $6,500,000 in punitive damages, when an insurer
only partially paid its insured's $225,000 fire loss claim. 8 A Nevada
jury awarded a construction company punitive damages of
$30,000,000 for its insurer's bad faith.9 A Missouri jury returned a
verdict exceeding $8,000,000 against a self-insured car rental
company that refused to settle a wrongful death claim for $25,000.0
In a 1993 case, a health insurer that deemed an insured's bone marrow
transplant "experimental" and refused to authorize the procedure was
hit for $12,320,000 in compensatory and $77,000,000 in punitive
damages." In another 1993 case, a Texas jury awarded compensatory
damages of $2,170,000 and punitive damages of $100,000,0002
against an insurer that denied a $20,000 uninsured motorist claim.'
In 1991, an Alabama court upheld a $750,000 punitive
damage award
13
claim.
$1,000
a
of
denial
faith
bad
insurer's
for an
Some insurers earn substantial bad faith judgments by virtue of their
reckless conduct or insensitive actions. Clayton v. United States
Automobile Ass'n 14 is an illustrative case. In Clayton, the insurer,
USAA, offered to pay a bereaved father no more than $10,000 under
his underinsured motorist coverage in connection with his teenage
son's death. At trial, the boy's interest in photography was discussed
in connection with USAA's valuation of the claim. The USAA
adjuster testified that "although the boy was a photographer, 'he was
no Ansel Adams.""' 5 The jury was apparently angered by the

Verdicts and Settlements, NAT'LL.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at A15.
Verdicts and Settlements, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at A17.
Verdicts and Settlements, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 1995, at A13.
Verdicts and Settlements, NAT'LL.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at A9.
Verdicts and Settlements, NAT'LL.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at A9.
Keith R. Krueger, Company Slammed for $8 Million After Refusal to Settle for
$25,000, Mo. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 17, 1994, at 1, 20.
11. 1993's Largest Verdicts, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 17, 1994, at S6.
12. Id.
13. Principal Fin. Group v. Thomas, 585 So. 2d 816, 818 (Ala. 1991).
14. No. 709993-9 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County, 1995), reported in Regional
Reports, NAT'L L.J., June 26, 1995, at A10.
15. Id.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1 0.
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adjuster's testimony and
responded by awarding the father $3,900,000
6
in punitive damages.'
Plaintiffs do not win all bad faith cases, of course. Insurers
frequently prevail at trial. 17 Additionally, courts do not always allow
outrageous bad faith verdicts to stand. Bad faith verdicts sometimes
are reduced or reversed by way of post-trial motions, or on appeal.'8
Even so, there is no doubt that bad faith claims are a big stick when
wielded by aggressive plaintiffs' counsel, who can use the threat of
extracontractual liability to bludgeon insurers into submission.
Insurers' vulnerability to bad faith claims at trial has not escaped
notice:
Bad faith claims are often more financially rewarding for a
policyholder and his attorney than simply collecting on the
underlying insurance claim. Accordingly, it has become
commonplace for plaintiffs' attorneys to focus their time and
energy on maneuvering insurance companies into committing
acts that can later be characterized as bad faith. 9
Additionally, in recent years, lecturers at continuing legal education
seminars have started advising their colleagues on how best to "set up"
insurers for bad faith claims. "Bad faith litigation against insurers is a
burgeoning
cottage industry throughout virtually all of the fifty
20
states.
Insurers' responses to this increasingly hostile judicial environment
have included arguments at trial, on appeal, and in industry forums,
that they, like other tort defendants, should be allowed to compare
their insureds' fault or bad faith, thus reducing their damage exposure.
Insurers have also asserted that they should be allowed to sue their
insureds for "reverse bad faith" under certain circumstances. 2 ' In
16. Id.
17.

See, e.g., Keith R. Krueger, Company Dodges $3 Million Bad Faith Insurance

Claim, Mo. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 25, 1996, at I (describing insurer's win at trial in thirdparty bad faith claim).
18. See, e.g., Quick v. National Auto Credit, 65 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1995) (reversing
verdict of $6,500,000 in compensatory damages and $885,000 in punitive damages),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1034 (1996); McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 523 (Ct. App. 1993), vacated, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Ct. App. 1994)
(reversing $48,943,165 judgment); Verdicts and Settlements, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1996,
at AI I (noting reversal of a $106 million bad faith judgment against underwriters at
Lloyd's of London).
19. William S. Anderson, Comment, Placing a Check on an Insured's Bad Faith
Conduct: The Defense of "Comparative Bad Faith," 35 S.TEX. L.J. 485, 487 (1994).
20. Peter M. Foley, Reverse Bad Faith, NEWSL. OF CORP. COUNS. COMM. (TORT & INS.
PRACTICE SEC., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CHICAGO, ILL.), Fall/Winter 1995, at 8.
21. See infra Parts IV, V.
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other words, insurers believe they should have an affirmative defense
in some cases, a counterclaim in other cases, and possibly even both.
Insurers' arguments for the application of comparative fault in bad
faith cases, "comparative bad faith" and "reverse bad faith," have
drawn a decade of scholarly attention. However, while scholars
have generally championed the adoption of comparative fault and
comparative bad faith and, to a lesser degree, reverse bad faith, courts
have not been so accepting. In the most recent case on point, the
Supreme Court of Iowa rejected a cause of action for reverse bad
faith. 24 Thus, the two-way street of good faith and fair dealing in
insurance policies remains for the most part a one-way street; it is at
best congested with judicial orange barrels and doctrinal detour signs.
If the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a two-way street under
construction, this Article is the equivalent of a progress meeting onsite. It is time to see where the law has been, assess where it is now,
and plan where it is going. First, this Article provides a brief
background of third-party bad faith25 and first-party bad faith causes of
action, 26 with a comparison to contract law. 27 Next, the Article
22. See infra Parts V, VI.
23. See, e.g., Daniel S. Bopp, Tort and Contract in Bad Faith Cases: Is the
Honeymoon Over?, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 524 (1992); James Win. Walker, Comparative
Bad Faith -- Its Time Has Come In Texas, 55 TEX. B.J. 792 (1992); D. Douglas Brothers,
The Defense of Comparative Bad Faith: A Practitioner'sViewpoint, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1565 (1994); John F. Dobbyn, Is Good Faith in Insurance Contracts a Two-Way Street?,
62 N.D. L. REV. 355 (1986); Douglas G. Houser et al., Comparative Bad Faith: The TwoWay Street Opens for Travel, 23 IDAHo L. REV. 367 (1986-87); R. Kent Livesay,
Comment, Levelling the Playing Field of Insurance Agreements in Texas: Adopting
ComparativeBad Faith as an Affirmative Defense Based on the Insured's Misconduct, 24
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1201 (1993); William Powers, Jr., What a Comparative Bad Faith
Defense Tells Us About Bad Faith Insurance Litigation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1571 (1994);
Ellen Smith Pryor, Comparative Fault and Insurance Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1505
(1994); Douglas R. Richmond, Insured's Bad Faith as Shield or Sword: Litigation Relief
for Insurers?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 41 (1993); Patrick E. Shipstead & Scott S. Thomas,
Comparative and Reverse Bad Faith: Insured's Breach of Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and FairDealing as Affirmative Defense or Counterclaim, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 215
(1987); Marjie D. Barrows, Reverse Bad Faith, THE BRIEF, Summer 1996, at 17; Stephen
D. Goldman, "Reverse Bad Faith": A New Tool for Insurers?,FOR THE DEF., Feb. 1996,
at 37; Anderson, supra note 19.
24. Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 203 (Iowa 1995). But see
Adams v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 898 SW.2d 216 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). In
Adams, a Tennessee court affirmed a trial court's entry of a judgment for an insurer in a
reverse bad faith case. Unfortunately for insurers, Adams is of little (if any) precedential
value outside Tennessee. The insurer's bad faith counterclaim was based on a specific
statutory provision granting the insurer a cause of action against the insured. Id. at 218.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See infra Part II.C.
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discusses the defenses of the insurer, examining both the insurer's
affirmative defense of comparative bad faith2" and the insurer's
counterclaim or separate action of reverse bad faith.2 9 The Article then
gives some examples of how insureds and insurers may alter their
situations, giving rise to comparative bad faith defenses. 30 Finally, the
Article concludes that courts need to recognize comparative fault and
comparative bad faith as affirmative defenses,31 as well as the
independent claim of reverse bad faith.32
II.BACKGROUND
The tort of insurance bad faith is relatively new; it dates back only to
the late 1950s, and it was not taken seriously until the 1970s. 33 Bad
faith claims may be made in the third-party context (liability insurance)
or in connection with first-party policies.
A court formulation of a tort duty of good faith and fair dealing is
unremarkable. Insureds purchase their policies for peace of mind and
security, rather than for financial gain.34 An insurer and its insured,
unlike parties to typical contracts, share a special relationship.35 This
unique relationship arises out of the parties' perceived disparate
bargaining power and the nature of insurance policies, which
potentially allow predatory or unscrupulous insurers to exploit their
insureds' misfortune when resolving claims.36 The duty of good faith
28. See infra Part III.A-B.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part V.A-B.
3 1. See infra Part V.B.
32. See infra Parts V.C-D, VI.
33. Robert H. Jerry II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith's
Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1994).
34. See Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 (Ct. App. 1990) ("An
insured does not enter into an insurance contract seeking profit, but instead seeks
security and peace of mind through protection against calamity."); Andrew Jackson Life
Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1179 n.9 (Miss. 1990) ("[A]n insured bargains
for more than mere eventual monetary proceeds of a policy; insureds bargain for such
intangibles as risk aversion, [and] peace of mind ....");Ainsworth v. Combined Ins.
Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 673, 676 (Nev. 1988) ("A consumer buys insurance for security,
protection, and peace of mind.").
As one embittered insured observed after prevailing at the arbitration of his fire loss
claim: "People buy insurance for peace of mind ....My peace of mind ended the day I
needed my insurance." Liz Comte Reisman, "Lowballing" Ranks Among Top
Complaints to Insurance Offices, K.C. STAR, Jan. 21, 1996, at F-4.
35. See, e.g., Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Potter, 912 P.2d 267, 272 (Nev. 1996);
Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. 1994).
36. See, e.g., Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987).
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and fair dealing between insurers and insureds fills the void created by
the parties' unequal
bargaining power and insurers' control over claim
37
processing.

A. Third-PartyBad Faith
The earliest bad faith cases arose in the third-party context.38 In
1967, the California Supreme Court held in Crisci v. Security
Insurance Co. 39 that a liability insurer's unreasonable refusal to settle a
claim within policy limits constituted an independent tort. 4° Today, a
tort cause of action for third-party bad faith is widely recognized.4'
37. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993).
38. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
39. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
40. Id. at 178.
41. See, e.g., Peckham v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 834-35 (1st Cir.
1990); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571-72 (Ariz. 1986); R.J. "Bob" Jones
Excavating Contractor, Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 920 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Ark. 1996);
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967); Flickinger v. Ninth Dist.
Prod. Credit Ass'n, 824 P.2d 19, 24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Grand Sheet Metal Prods.
Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Boston
Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 784-85 (Fla. 1980); Best Place, Inc.
v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 336 (Haw. 1996); Salvator v. Admiral Merchants
Motor Freight, 509 N.E.2d 1349, 1357-58 (I11.App. Ct. 1987); North Iowa State Bank
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 471 N.W.2d 824, 828-29 (Iowa 1991); Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161, 164-66 (Mich. 1986); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 367 A.2d 864, 866-72 (N.J. 1976); Roldan v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Maine Bonding &
Cas. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Or. 1985) (en banc); Calenda v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 518 A.2d 624, 628-29 (R.I. 1986); Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167; Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 146 S.E.2d 220, 228 (Va. 1966); Tank v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1136-37 (Wash. 1986); Professional Office Bldgs., Inc. v.
Royal Indem. Co., 427 N.W.2d 427, 432-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); Darlow v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 822 P.2d 820, 823 (Wyo. 1991).
Not all jurisdictions have accepted third-party bad faith as an independent tort. In
Kansas, an insurer's failure to defend or settle a third-party claim amounts to a breach of
contract; it is not an independent tort. Aves v. Shah, 906 P.2d 642, 648 (Kan. 1995).
Kansas courts merely use tort expressions to describe the substance of a contract duty.
The District of Columbia does not recognize bad faith in either the third-party or firstparty context. Washington v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 383, 38687 (D.D.C. 1991). Maine does not recognize either third-party or first-party bad faith,
instead allowing expanded general and consequential damages for an insurer's breach of
its contractual obligations. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 652
(Me. 1993). Maine also employs an unfair claims practices statute. Id. Nevada has yet
to adopt third-party bad faith; however, based on Nevada courts' holdings in other
contexts, it seems likely that it will when presented the opportunity. Pemberton v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 858 P.2d 380 (Nev. 1993) (recognizing first-party bad faith);
Nevada Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Sierra Auto Ctr., 844 P.2d 126, 127-29 (Nev. 1992) (no
third-party bad faith because no privity of contract). Pennsylvania has no common law
bad faith; Pennsylvania's cause of action is statutorily created. Terletsky v. Prudential
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To fully understand liability insurers' potential bad faith exposure in
the third-party context, it is necessary to understand the three related
duties of insurers: the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify, and the
duty to settle.
1. The Duty to Defend
Standard liability policy language obligates insurers to defend their
insureds even against groundless, false, and fraudulent suits. The
duty to defend arises upon the insured's tender. As a general rule,
whether a defense is owed is determined by comparing the petition or
complaint with the policy. 4 2 Several jurisdictions have expanded on
what is commonly described as the "eight corners rule, 43 sometimes
requiring the insurer to look beyond the pleadings to determine
whether it owes the insured a defense. 44 These jurisdictions properly
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 659
A.2d 560 (Pa. 1995).
42. See, e.g., Bernstein v. North E. Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 1456, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(applying District of Columbia law); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Lee Anesthesia, 641 So. 2d
247, 249 (Ala. 1994); Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Sing, 850 S.W.2d 6,7 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993);
Gerrity Co. v. CIGNA Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 606, 607 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993); Exel Logistics, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 671 A.2d 408, 410-11 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1996); Fun Spree Vacations, Inc. v. Orion Ins. Co., 659 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995); Hames Contracting, Inc. v. Georgia Ins. Co., 440 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994); Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 872
P.2d 230, 233 (Haw. 1994); City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indem. Co., 888 P.2d 383, 387
(Idaho 1995); Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 398 (I11. 1994);
Ottumwa Housing Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Iowa
1993); James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814
S.W.2d 273, 279 (Ky. 1991); Steptore v. Masco Constr. Co., 643 So. 2d 1213, 1218
(La. 1994); Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Dolley, 669 A.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Me. 1996);
Town of Ayer v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 634 N.E.2d 571, 572 (Mass. 1994); Green
Mountain Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 641 A.2d 230, 232 (N.H. 1994); Lopez v. New Mexico
Pub. Sch. Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 745, 747 (N.M. 1994); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 446 S.E.2d 877, 878 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Ledford v. Gutoski, 877 P.2d 80,
82 (Or. 1994); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Roe, 650 A.2d 94, 98-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994);
Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785, 787 (R.I. 1995); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Piedmont Petroleum Corp., 444 S.E.2d 532, 533 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); City of Ft. Pierre
v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D. 1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Tenn. 1994); Crum & Forster, Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 887 S.W.2d 103, 121 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Brenner v. Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp., 397 S.E.2d 100, 102 (Va. 1990); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roffe, Inc., 872
P.2d 536, 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); City of Edgerton v. General Cas. Co. of Wisc.,
517 N.W.2d 463, 470 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1360 (1995); Reisig v.
Union Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Wyo. 1994).
43. See, e.g., Cheverly Terrace Partnership v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 642 A.2d 285,
287 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz, 639 A.2d
1208, 1210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
44. See, e.g., D.D. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 905 P.2d 1365, 1368 n.5
(Alaska 1995); Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., 900 P.2d 619, 627 (Cal. 1995); First Nat'l

102

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

view the eight comers rule as an inclusionary standard. In other
words, every petition or complaint alleging a covered cause of action
gives rise to a duty to defend. The eight comers rule is not a valid
exclusionary standard, meaning that the plaintiff's pleaded allegations
should not be dispositive of the insurer's defense obligation. This is
especially true where the petition or complaint is unclear, resulting in
uncertainties about coverage.45 Indeed, the eight corners rule is
seriously undermined by the liberal notice pleading allowed in many
jurisdictions. 6
An insurer's duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.47
Any question as to whether a defense is owed is always resolved in the
Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 545 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); Spivey v.
Safeco Ins. Co., 865 P.2d 182, 188 (Kan. 1993); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 651
A.2d 859, 863-66 (Md. 1995); American Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
550 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Mich. 1996); Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d
254, 258 (Minn. 1993); Standard Artificial Limb, Inc. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d
205, 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
502 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Neb. 1993); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607
A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d
90, 93-94 (N.Y. 1991); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 79899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Utah 1986).
45. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 667 So. 2d 661, 668 (Ala. 1995).
46. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 545 N.W.2d 332, 335-36
(Iowa Ct. App. 1996). As the court in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sunshine Corp.,
74 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1996), observed:
It is true that the duty of an insurance company to defend its insured is
determined by the allegations of the pleading in which the claim against the
insured is asserted . . . . But this does not mean that a particular choice of
(language] by the draftsman of a complaint against the insured can deprive the
insured of its contractual right to an insurer-provided defense in a situation
where the plaintiff could recover a judgment for damages against the insured
even if the [language] should prove ill-chosen.
Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
47. See, e.g., IMCERA Group, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 583,
597 (Ct. App. 1996); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083,
1089 (Colo. 1991); Irvine v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579, 580
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Essex Ins. Co. v. Fieldhouse, Inc., 506 N.W.2d 772, 775
(Iowa 1993); Dennis v. Finish Line, Inc., 636 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 644 So. 2d 636 (La. 1994); State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 36 (Me.
1991); Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996); John Markel Ford, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 173, 179 (Neb.
1996); Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 638 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (App. Div.
1996); Carstensen v. Chrisland Corp., 442 S.E.2d 660, 666 (Va. 1994); Elliott v.
Donahue, 485 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Wis. 1992), modified by Dechant v. Monarch Life Ins.
Co., 547 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 1996) (limiting Elliott to its facts and circumstances; the
Dechant court awarded attorney fees to insured and based decision upon tort of first party
bad faith, rather than upon breach of duty to defend as in Elliott). See infra Part II.A.2
(discussing the duty to indemnify).
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insured's favor. 48 An insurer owes its insured a defense if the
plaintiff's allegations are even arguably or potentially within the scope
of the policy. 49 Even so, an insurer need not defend when no potential
for coverage exists under any theory.50
2. The Duty to Indemnify and the Duty to Settle
An insurer's contractual duty to indemnify its insured for a covered
loss is not triggered until the insured incurs liability for the underlying
claim. 5' The timing of this duty is made clear by standard policy
language, which provides that the insurer will "pay those sums that the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages. 52 To protect
insureds' interests in the interim, and to generally shield insureds from
financial ruin, courts imply a duty on insurers' part to attempt in good
faith to settle claims for their insureds' benefit. 53 The implied duty to
48. See, e.g., Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 796 (Cal. 1993);
American Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 523 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994), aff'd, 550 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1996); Hart Constr. Co. v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 384, 389 (N.D. 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Russo,
641 A.2d 1304, 1306 (R.I. 1994); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kneen, 484 N.W.2d 908,
912 (S.D. 1992); Clemons v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 879 S.W.2d 385, 392 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994).
49. See, e.g., Madden v. Continental Cas. Co., 922 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Ark. Ct. App.
1996); Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 904 (Haw. 1994);
Shunn Constr., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 897 P.2d 89, 90 (Idaho 1995); LaphamHickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ill. 1995);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1081, 1082 (Me. 1995);
Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 619-20 (Md. 1995); American Bumper, 550
N.W.2d at 481; Ross v. Briggs & Morgan, 540 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn. 1995); Bonner
v. Automobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995);
Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co., 635 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio 1994); Isle of Palms Pest
Control Co. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 459 S.E.2d 318, 319 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994), aff'd,
468 S.E.2d 304 (1996); City of Burlington v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 655 A.2d
719, 721 (Vt. 1994).
50. See, e.g., La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 884 P.2d
1048, 1057 (Cal. 1994); Moore v. Continental Ins. Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 183 (Ct.
App. 1996); Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 907 P.2d 807, 810 (Idaho 1995); United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Caplin, 656 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); MGM, Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 79-80 (Kan. 1993); Thompson v. West Am. Ins.
Co., 839 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); Insured Titles, Inc. v. McDonald, 911
P.2d 209, 212 (Mont. 1996); Frontier Ins. Co. v. State, 662 N.E.2d 251, 253 (N.Y.
1995).
51. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 883 n.9
(Cal. 1995); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1221
(Ill. 1992); Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1196, 1204
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Chantel Assoc. v.
Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 779 (Md. 1995).
52. 1 SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES
ANNOTATED 409 (1995).

53. See, e.g., Jordan v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 843 F. Supp. 164, 171
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settle thus supplements insurers' duty to indemnify, although at least
one court has labeled it a category of the duty to defend.- 4
In order to breach its implied duty to settle, an insurer must first be
presented with a covered claim. An insurer has no duty to settle a
claim or suit that falls outside the scope of its coverage." Once
coverage is established, an insured must be offered a settlement within
policy limits. A liability insurer is not obligated to initiate settlement
negotiations with a third-party claimant.56 If the plaintiff does not
make a settlement demand or offer, the insurer cannot breach its
implied duty. 7 Similarly, if the plaintiff's settlement demand or offer
exceeds policy limits, the insurer cannot later be held liable for
refusing to settle. 8
An insurer is not always obligated to settle a claim within policy
limits under penalty of absolute liability for any subsequent excess
judgment against the insured.5 9 An insurer's bad judgment does not

(S.D. Miss. 1993); Carrier Express, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 860 F. Supp. 1465, 147879 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 893 P.2d 39, 45 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994), vacated in part, 913 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. 1996); Flickinger v. Ninth Dist.
Prod. Credit Ass'n, 824 P.2d 19, 24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Scribner v. AIU Ins. Co.,
647 A.2d 48, 51 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Bishara, 916 P.2d 1275,
1278-79 (Idaho 1996); Levier v. Koppenheffer, 879 P.2d 40, 46-47 (Kan. Ct. App.
1994); State ex rel. Shelton v. Mummert, 879 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Mo. 1994); Venetsanos
v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 644 A.2d 614 (N.J. 1994); Continental Cas. Co. v. Kinsey, 513 N.W.2d 66, 69
(N.D. 1994); American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 849 (Tex.
1994); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 138 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); Larocque v. State Farm Ins. Co., 660 A.2d 286, 288 (Vt. 1995).
54. Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 90 (Kan. 1990) (holding that action for wrongful
failure to settle arises from insurer's contractual obligation to defend and, as such, is
based in contract).
55. See, e.g., Lira v. Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514, 516 (Colo. 1996).
56. See Stevenson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 628 N.E.2d 810, 814 (I11.App. Ct.
1993), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 15 (I11.1994). But see Powell v. Prudential Property
& Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (insurer has affirmative
duty to initiate settlement where liability is clear and damages obviously exceed policy
limits); Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d 1333, 1340 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div.) ("[T]he insurer has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt
to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage."), cert. denied, 644 A.2d 614 (N.J.
1994).
57. See, e.g., Messersmith v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 881 (Ct.
App. 1995) (unpublished opinion may not be cited in California); Wierck v. Grinnell
Mut. Reins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 194-95 (Iowa 1990); Snodgrass v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 1012, 1022 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).
58. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559,
566-67 (Ct. App. 1994); Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314-15
(Tex. 1994).
59. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 639 A.2d 652, 659 (Md. 1994).
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necessarily equate with bad faith. 60 In many cases a vigorous defense
is superior to a proposed policy limits settlement. An insurer's duty to
settle does not translate into a unilateral requirement that it pay policy
limits upon demand. 6' An insurer may decline to settle a case without
incurring subsequent bad faith liability if it reasonably believes that the
insured is not liable, or that the plaintiff's demand exceeds a probable
jury award. 62 The insurer must, however, give its insured's interests
the same consideration that it gives its own interests.63
3. To Whom Are the Duties Owed?
An insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing is fundamentally
contractual; it does not extend to every person arguably entitled to
payment from policy proceeds. As a general rule, a liability insurer's
duties flow only to its insured; an insurer does not owe a third-party
claimant a duty of good faith.' Absent a "direct action" statute, a third
party cannot sue a liability insurer directly for the company's alleged
bad faith.65
B. First-PartyBad Faith
First-party bad faith originated in Fletcherv. Western NationalLife
60. See, e g., Sharpe v. Physicians Protective Trust Fund, 578 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 85 (Kan. 1990); Northfield Ins.
Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 545 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
61. See Lehto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 814, 822 (Ct. App. 1994), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 80 (1995).
62. See Lyndwood, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., No. C7-93-1176, 1994 WL 6842, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1994); see also Anglo-American Ins. Co. v. Molin, 670 A.2d
194, 197-98 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (insurer may reject policy limits settlement offer if
it has a bona fide belief that insured has a good possibility of succeeding on the merits).
63. See Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 792 P.2d 719, 722-23 (Ariz.
1990); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Bishara, 916 P.2d 1275, 1278-80, 1282-84 (Idaho 1996).
64. See O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 526
(Alaska 1988); Hand v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 264 (Ct. App. 1994);
Dunn v. National Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993); Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Dvorak
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D. 1993); McWhirter v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 878 P.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Okla. 1994); Johnson v. Beane, 664 A.2d 96,
99 n.3 (Pa. 1995); Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 279-80 (Tex.
1995); Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah Ct. App.
1991); Larocque v. State Farm Ins. Co., 660 A.2d 286, 288 (Vt. 1995); Planet Ins. Co.
v. Wong, 877 P.2d 198, 201 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
65. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Tex. 1994) (articulating
conflict of interest theory precluding insurers' duties to third-party claimants). But see
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Green, 624 So. 2d 538, 539-40 (Ala. 1993) (plaintiff can
sue as third-party beneficiary when insurer's liability is not predicated upon the
insured's liability).
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Insurance Co. 66 In Fletcher,an insurer was held liable in tort for its

refusal to honor its insured's disability policy. Comparing third-party
principles with the situation before it, the Fletchercourt stated:
We think that, similarly, the implied-in-law duty of good faith
and fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not to
threaten to withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously
and without probable cause, for the purpose of injuring its
insured by depriving him of the benefits of the policy. We
think that . . . the violation of that duty sounds in tort
notwithstanding that it also constitutes a breach of contract.67
The California Supreme Court expanded Fletcher in Gruenberg v.
Aetna Insurance Co.,68 which is widely regarded as the landmark firstparty bad faith case.69 The Gruenberg insurers denied liability for the
plaintiff's fire loss, believing that the plaintiff committed arson in
connection with a fire at his cocktail lounge and restaurant.7 °
Explaining its endorsement of a first-party bad faith cause of action,
the court stated:
[I]n Comunale and Crisci we made it clear that "[l]iability is
imposed [on the insurer] not for a bad faith breach of contract
but for failure to meet the duty to accept reasonable settlements,
a duty included within the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing." (Crisci,supra, 66 Cal. 2d at p. 430, 58 Cal. Rptr.
at p. 17, 426 P.2d at p. 177.) In those two cases, we considered
the duty of the insurer to act in good faith and fairly in
handling the claims of third persons against the insured,
described as a "duty to accept reasonable settlements"; in the
case before us we consider the duty of an insurer to act in good
faith and fairly in handling the claim of an insured, namely a
duty not to withhold unreasonably payments due under a
policy. These are merely two different aspects of the same duty.
That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the
terms of the policy itself-to defend, settle, or pay. It is the
obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under which the
insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its
contractual responsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal
fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without
proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the
policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort

66. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970).

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 93.
510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973) (en banc).
Bopp, supra note 23, at 526.
See Gruenberg, 510 P.2d at 1034-35.
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for breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
7
dealing. '

Courts have reluctantly embraced first-party bad faith as an
independent tort.71 Unlike the third-party relationship in which the
insured is wholly dependent on the insurer to protect his interests, the
insurer and insured do not deal in trust when a first-party claim is
made. Instead, the insurer and insured "are in an adversary
relationship whenever there is any claim by [the] insured for loss
under any [first-party] insurance policy. '73 Absent a special
relationship, reliance on contract law affords the insured an adequate
remedy. Nonetheless, a number of jurisdictions apparently recognize
first-party bad faith as an independent tort.74
71. Id. at 1037 (emphasis in original).
72. See, e.g., Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 264 (Del.
1995) (first-party bad faith is breach of contract); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
795, 798-800 (Utah 1985) (bad faith in the first-party context is a contract claim, albeit
with expanded consequential damages). But see Yuen v. American Republic Ins. Co.,
786 F. Supp. 531, 533 (D. Md. 1992) (no first-party bad faith in Maryland); Taylor v.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing
to recognize first-party bad faith).
73. State ex rel. Safeco Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rauch, 849 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993); accord Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 905 (Mont. 1993)
(in uninsured motorist case, insurer and insured "are in adverse positions from the
outset"); Lauzon v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Vt. 1995)
(discussing uninsured motorist coverage).
74. The following states apparently recognize the bad faith breach of a first-party
insurance contract as a common law tort: Coleman v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d
944, 946 (Ala. 1987); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156
(Alaska 1989); Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1079-80 (Ariz. 1987);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Ark. 1984);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Cal. 1973) (en banc); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Grand Sheet Metal Prods.
Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Casson v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 361, 368 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Douville, 510 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Best Place, Inc. v. Penn
Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 336 (Haw. 1996); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730
P.2d 1014, 1018 (Idaho 1986); Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ind.
1993); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); Curry v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176, 177-78 (Ky. 1989); Weems v. American Sec. Ins. Co.,
486 So. 2d 1222, 1226 (Miss. 1986); Lipinski v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 970, 977
(Mont. 1982); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 776 (Neb. 1991);
Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993); Chavez v.
Chenoweth, 553 P.2d 703, 709 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); Payne v. North Carolina Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 313 S.E.2d 912, 914 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Hoskins v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ohio 1983); Marshall v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 831
P.2d 651, 653-54 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313,
319 (R.I. 1980); Carter v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 307 S.E.2d 225, 226 (S.C.
1983); In re Certification of Question of Law from the United States Dist. Court
(Champion v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.), 399 N.W.2d 320, 322 (S.D. 1987);
MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flint, 574 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tenn. 1978); Arnold v. National
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First-party bad faith translates into an insurer's refusal to pay a
claim without a lawful or reasonable basis, or an insurer's refusal,
without proper cause, to compensate an insured for a covered loss."
The unreasonableness of the insurer's conduct is the essence of the
tort.7 6 The aggrieved insured generally must establish (1) the
unreasonableness of the insurer's conduct, and (2) that the insurer
knew or should have known that it was being unreasonable." The
reasonableness of an insurer's conduct must be considered in light of
the situation as a whole.78 An insurer maintains the right to deny
invalid or questionable claims without being considered to be acting in
bad faith.7
An insurer may pass one or both prongs of the first-party bad faith
test, thus avoiding extracontractual liability, by proving that its
obligation to pay the claim was "fairly debatable," or "reasonably
debatable., 80 In other words, were there factual or legal questions
concerning the insurer's obligations that account for its delay or refusal
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987); Bushey v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 670 A.2d 807, 809 (Vt. 1995); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d
368, 376-77 (Wis. 1978); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 857-59
(Wyo. 1990).
75. See Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Alaska
1993); Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993); Dowling v.
Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 11, 400 S.E.2d 143, 144 (S.C. 1991).
An insurer may also act in bad faith by subjecting its insured to "unfair and
oppressive" pressure in the attempted settlement of a first-party claim. Parham v.
Church Mut. Ins. Co., 918 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Ark. Ct. App.), vacated on other grounds,
922 S.W.2d 724 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996).
76. See, e.g., Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 534, 537 (Idaho Ct. App.
1990); London v. Trinity Cos., 877 P.2d 620, 622 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
77. See Turner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Cos., 614 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Ala. 1993);
Ness v. Western Sec. Life Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 122, 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Leahy v.
Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 697, 700 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, No.
95SC14, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 806 (Dec. 11, 1995) (en banc); Morgan v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa 1995); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Simpsonville Wrecker Serv., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994);
Weatherly v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Neb. Ct. App.
1994); Miglicio v. HCM Claim Management Corp., 672 A.2d 266, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1995); Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. 1995); Bushey
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 807, 809 (Vt. 1995); Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co.,
541 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Wis. 1995).
78. See Forcucci v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 11 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1993).
79. See, e.g., Adams v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 655 So. 2d 969, 971-72 (Ala. 1995);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 632 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993), rev'd on other grounds, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1995).
80 See Brown v. Danish Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 550 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa Ct. App.
1996); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464-65 (Utah 1996); Lauzon
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 1246, 1247 (Vt. 1995).

1996]

Insurance Good Faith

to pay the claim?"' Insurers are entitled to challenge or deny fairly
debatable claims.8 2 Whether a claim is fairly or reasonably debatable
generally is a question of law. 3
Insurers cannot be held liable for bad faith if they assert legitimate
coverage defenses to a claim.84 Similarly, an insurer may avoid bad
faith liability if its obligation to pay a claim is an open legal question, 5
or if it changes its position and promptly resolves a claim when it
learns of legal authority supporting the insured's position.8 6 It is not
bad faith for an insurer to deny a claim based on a fairly debatable
policy interpretation even if courts later reject that interpretation.'
When faced with questions about their legal responsibilities,
insurers usually seek judicial clarification or determinations of their
duties through declaratory judgment actions. An insurer's legitimate
resort to a judicial determination is not an act of bad faith.88 Most
courts will not penalize an insurer for litigating an issue of first
impression.8 9
8 1. See S & W Properties, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 668 So. 2d 529, 532
(Ala. 1995) (plaintiff must show that insurer has no factual or legal defense to the
claim); Morgan v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa 1995)
(claim may be fairly debatable as to either a matter of fact or law); Larsen v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (fairly debatable claims may concern
matters of fact or law).
82. See Wetherbee v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 508 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Iowa 1993);
Pickett v. Lloyd's, 621 A.2d 445, 453-54 (N.J. 1993); Rumford Property & Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Carbone, 590 A.2d 398, 400 (R.I. 1991); Jordan v. Union Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp.
1031, 1033 (D.S.D. 1991).
83. See AMCO Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lamphere, 541 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996); Bushey v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 807, 810 (Vt. 1995). Contra Watts v. Westland Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 895 P.2d 626, 630 (Mont. 1995) (whether claim is fairly or reasonably
debatable is question of fact for the jury).
84. See First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 801, 81112 (8th Cir. 1993); Claborn v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 910 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Okla.
1996); Matthews v. Home Ins. Co., 916 S.W.2d 666, 669-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996);
Roberts v. Allied Group Ins. Co., 901 P.2d 317, 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
85. See Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 1473, 1484 (S.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd
in part, 68 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1995); Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 828 S.W.2d 915,
920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d
502, 510 (Pa. 1993).
86. See, e.g., Harrington v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 628 So. 2d 323 (Ala. 1993).
87. See, e.g., Mills v. Regent Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
88. See Ballinger v. Security Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 862 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla.
1993).
89. See, e.g., Garrison v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 894 P.2d 226, 235 (Kan.
Ct. App.), aff'd, 907 P.2d 891 (Kan. 1995); Coblentz v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 938, 940 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, (Okla. 1996);
Pressman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757 (R.I. 1990); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v.
Glick, 397 S.E.2d 105, 109 (Va. 1990).
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C. Bad FaithDamages
Modern insurance bad faith claims have their genesis in contract. 90
First-party bad faith claims remain rooted in contract. 9' Many aspects
of the relationship between liability insurers and their insureds are
contractual. For example, a liability insurer's wrongful refusal to
defend its insured is a breach of contract.92 When an insurer is found
to have breached its contract by refusing to defend a covered claim, the
policyholder must be put in the position he would have enjoyed had
there been no breach. 93 Similarly, if a liability insurer declines to
indemnify its insured in connection with a covered loss, or if an
insurer declines to settle a claim or suit within policy limits, the
insurer's failure is a breach of contract. 94 The insured must therefore
be restored to her position before the breach as a matter of fundamental
contract law.95
In order to incur bad faith liability, an insurer must do more than
simply breach its contract with its insured. As the Arkansas Supreme

90. See Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1142 (Ariz. 1993)
(en banc), vacated in part, 913 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. 1996).
9 1. See Nevada Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Sierra Auto Ctr., 844 P.2d 126, 128-29 (Nev.
1992) (requiring contractual relationship between insurer and bad faith claimant); see
also Gray v. Holman, 909 P.2d 776, 780 n.9 (Okla. 1995) (while insured has but a
single cause of action, the claim may be advanced concurrently on contract and tort
theories).
The plaintiff in Fobes v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Arizona, Inc., 861 P.2d 692
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), alleged the defendant's bad faith in denying her husband benefits
under his health insurance policy. The plaintiff had a separate policy with the defendant.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff was not a named insured on her husband's policy and was not a
third-party beneficiary under his policy, the Fobes court easily affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of her bad faith claims. See id. at 694-98. Other courts have reached similar
results. See, e.g., Steptoe v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 437 S.E.2d 626, 628-29 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1993), cert. denied, No. 594C0260, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 240 (Jan. 28, 1994); Gunny
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 830 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Nev. 1992); Eastham v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 586 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
92. See Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 822, 833
(D.N.M.), amended in part, clarified in part, 866 F. Supp. 1560 (D.N.M. 1994); Earth
Elements, Inc. v. National Am. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 401-02 (Ct. App. 1995);
Seitlin & Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); ABC
Builders, Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1191-92 (N.H. 1995);
Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co., 635 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio 1994); Greer v. Northwestern
Nat'l Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Wash. 1987); Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins.
Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. 1993).
93. See ABC Builders, 661 A.2d at 1191-92; Greer, 743 P.2d at 1250.
94. See Miel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 1333, 1340 n.1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995).
95. See Northwest Pump & Equip. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 1025,
1028-29 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
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Court observed in First Marine Insurance Co. v. Booth,96 "[t]o be
liable for bad faith the insurer must engage in affirmative misconduct,
without a good faith defense, in a malicious, dishonest, or oppressive
attempt to avoid liability. '97 While the FirstMarine court's definition
of bad faith may be a bit strong,9" it makes clear that bad faith tort
liability hinges on the parties' relationship independent of the insurance
policy.
Insurers that breach their duty of good faith and fair dealing may
face extracontractual damages. Plaintiffs may recover compensatory
damages exceeding those available under contract law if they are able
to link claimed losses to the insurer's conduct. Insureds may recover
compensatory damages for emotional distress or mental anguish
attributable to insurers' alleged bad faith, 99 and they may sometimes
recover interest.' 00 Additionally, although the standards vary, most
jurisdictions allow punitive damages in bad faith actions.'0 '
96. 876 S.W.2d 255 (Ark. 1994).
97. Id. at 257; accord Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Ky. 1986);
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Mich.
1986).
98. At least one court suggests a trend toward relaxed third-party bad faith standards.
See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Mass. 1994)
("[T]he trend in this country as a practical matter is toward the use of a negligence
standard."). Several states allow bad faith recovery for an insurer's simple negligence.
See, e.g., Indiana Ins. Co. v. Plummer Power Mower & Tool Rental, Inc., 590 N.E.2d
1085, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312,
314 (Tex. 1994); Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va.
1990).
99. See Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 885 P.2d 265, 269-70 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994), aff'd, 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1996); Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 530 A.2d
596, 600-01 (Conn. 1987); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assocs., Ltd., 514
N.W.2d 912, 916 (Iowa 1994); Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So. 2d 290, 295
(Miss. 1992); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464 N.W.2d 769, 778 (Neb. 1991); Guaranty
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Potter, 912 P.2d 267, 272-73 (Nev. 1996); Harrell v. Old Am. Ins. Co.,
829 P.2d 75, 80 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, (Jan. 15, 1992); see also Marshall
v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791, 797 (W. Va. 1994) (allowing damages for "aggravation and
inconvenience").
100. See United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ira, 577 N.E.2d 588, 592 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991); McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621, 626 (Fla. 1992). The holding
in McLeod was in effect superseded by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727(10) (West Supp.
1996), which prohibits recovery for interest except on unpaid benefits.
101. See, e.g., Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Stephens Enters., 641 So. 2d 780, 784 (Ala.
1994); Viking Ins. Co. v. Jester, 836 S.W.2d 371, 377-79 (Ark. 1992); Ballow v.
PHICO Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 672, 682 (Colo. 1994); Dunn v. National Sec. Fire and Cas.
Co., 631 So. 2d 1103, 1108-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Nelson v. Jimison, 634
N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Sessoms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516,
519 (Miss. 1993); Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Potter, 912 P.2d 267, 273 (Nev. 1996);
Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 827 P.2d 118, 134 (N.M. 1992); Rocanova v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the U.S., 634 N.E.2d 940, 943-44 (N.Y. 1994); Miller v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 435 S.E.2d 537, 544 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); Zoppo v.
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In the typical third-party case in which a liability insurer
unreasonably refuses or fails to settle a case within policy limits, the
key element is the insurer's liability for the excess judgment.' 1 2
Assuming that the insurer acts in bad faith, the mere entry of an excess
judgment is sufficient to hold the offending insurer wholly liable, even
if the insured is judgment-proof.10 3 Conversely, a liability insurer's
refusal to settle cannot be deemed an act of bad faith if the subsequent
verdict is within policy limits. There must be an excess judgment in
order for an insured to be damaged by a liability insurer's refusal to
settle. '04
III. COMPARATIVE FAULT AND COMPARATIVE BAD FAITH

The ease with which insureds can assert bad faith claims adversely
affects insurers' ability to fully investigate and ultimately deny
fraudulent and frivolous claims.'0 5 Insureds' suits against insurers
have proliferated since the early 1980s. Insurers spend significant
sums defending suits in which their insureds' misconduct or
negligence contributed to the claimed damages. 0 6 Consequently, all
insured consumers bear the costs associated with bad faith litigation
through increased premiums. 0 7 Ultimately, consumers' ability to
procure insurance in some states may be affected.

Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ohio 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 56
(1995); Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1114-15 (Okla. 1991); Cock-NBull Steak House, Inc. v. Generali Ins. Co., 466 S.E.2d 727, 731-32 (S.C. 1996);
Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex. 1994); Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993); Poling v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 450
S.E.2d 635, 637 (W. Va. 1994); Weiss v. United Fire and Cas. Co., 541 N.W.2d 753,
764-65 (Wis. 1995); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 860-61 (Wyo.
1990).
102. See Strauss v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 813-14 (Ct. App.
1994); Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y v. Evans, 622 A.2d 103, 114 (Md. 1993); Soto v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222, 1224 (N.Y. 1994).
103. Judgment-proof insureds are damaged by excess judgments because their credit is
potentially impaired, their ability to borrow may be diminished, title to their property
may be clouded, and they may be forced into bankruptcy. See McNally v. Nationwide
Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1987).
104. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374, 383
n.l1 (Ct. App. 1995); Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 179, 181
(Fla. 1994); Conquest v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994), aff'd, 658 So.2d 928 (Fla. 1995).
105. See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Adjusters and Plaintiffs' Attorneys: From
Claims Fraud Consensus to Settlement Reform, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 537, 566-67 (1993).
106. Livesay, supra note 23, at 1218.
107. Id.
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A. Courts' Acceptance of ComparativeBad Faith
and ComparativeFault
"Comparative bad faith" is just that: a comparison of the insured's
0
The
deliberate or intentional misconduct with that of the insurer.O'
defense of comparative bad faith rests on the premise that if insureds
are not allowed to recover when their conduct has been wrongful, they
are more likely to assist insurers in the timely and reasonable
resolution of their claims.'°9
"Comparative fault" refers to the comparison of insureds'
negligence with insurers' alleged reckless or willful misconduct." 0 In
the bad faith context, the application of comparative fault principles
seems incongruous. Specifically, the defense requires courts and
juries to compare insureds' simple negligence with insurers' reckless
or willful misconduct. As a practical matter, courts generally fail to
distinguish between these two affirmative defenses, or they use them
interchangeably. "'
Whether courts will allow insurers to assert their insureds'
comparative bad faith or comparative fault in particular cases is always
an open question. In Carpenter v. Automobile Club Interinsurance
Exchange," 2 the Eighth Circuit apparently recognized comparative
fault as an affirmative defense to a third-party bad faith claim." 3
However, because there was no evidentiary support for the defense on
the record before it, the Carpenter court upheld the trial court's
decision to preclude the insurer's use of the defense below."l4 In First
National Bank of Louisville v. Lustig,"5 a federal district court in
Louisiana applying Kentucky law refused to strike an insurer's
comparative bad faith defense. 16 The court reasoned that because the
plaintiff could not show that the defense had been unequivocally
rejected by Kentucky
courts, its application presented a substantial
7
question."
legal
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
1965)).
115.
1993).
116.
117.

Richmond, supra note 23, at 50.
Anderson, supra note 19, at 488.
Richmond, supra note 23, at 50.
Id.
58 F.3d 1296 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1303-04 (citing Worden v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.
Nos. CIV.A.87-5488, CIV.A.88-1682, 1993 WL 411126 (E.D. La. Oct. 5,
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
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Several courts have refused to instruct juries on comparative bad
faith or comparative fault without expressly rejecting the doctrines. In
Alexander Underwriters General Agency, Inc. v. Lovett,"' the trial
court refused to instruct the jury on the insured's bad faith. The
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, but based its
decision on the absence of evidence supporting the offered
instruction." 9 Similarly, in Jessen v. National Excess Insurance
Co.,'20 the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to submit a comparative bad faith instruction, cautiously stating
that it was not deciding "whether such an instruction necessarily would
be inappropriate in another case." '

A number of courts have expressly rejected the two defenses. In
Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. King, 22 a Florida
appellate court held that the trial court did not err in striking the
insurer's comparative bad faith defense.
The King court
unequivocally held: "We decline to create a new affirmative defense of
comparative bad faith." '23 Similarly, in Stumpf v. Continental
Casualty Co., 124 Oregon rejected comparative fault in bad faith cases.

The Stumpf court observed that "it would be nonsensical to hold that
an insured who has bargained away control of his own case
nevertheless may be liable for conducting it negligently."' ' The court
reasoned that the defense was unavailable to insurers because the
rights and duties of parties to insurance policies are contractual in
nature.126
The Montana Supreme Court also rejected comparative fault in bad
faith cases in Stephens v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America.127 The
Stephens plaintiffs sued Safeco when they were unable to settle their
first-party fire claim. At trial, Safeco compared the plaintiffs' fault,
alleging that they violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing,
failed to mitigate their damages, and interfered with Safeco's
118. 357 S.E.2d 258 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
119. Id. at 265.
120. 776 P.2d 1244 (N.M. 1989).
121. Id. at 1249.
122. 568 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
123. Id. at 990-91.
124. 794 P.2d 1228 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
125. Id. at 1233.
126. Id. South Dakota also rejected comparative fault in bad faith cases. See Isaac v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 N.W.2d 752 (S.D. 1994). The Isaac court concluded
that an insured's negligence cannot be compared with an insurer's intentional conduct.
Id. at 759-60.
127. 852 P.2d 565 (Mont. 1993).
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performance of its contractual duties. The jury found the plaintiffs to
be fifty-three percent at fault and Safeco forty-seven percent at fault;
under Montana's modified comparative fault scheme, the plaintiffs
recovered nothing. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that comparative
fault did not apply to bad faith cases. 28 The Stephens court agreed.
The Stephens court first observed that only tortious conduct can be
compared. If the insurer breaches the duty of good faith and fair
dealing, the insured's cause of action sounds in tort.' 29 But, the court
noted, if the situation is reversed,
the insured's bad faith conduct is
30
merely a breach of contract.
The court determined that bad faith is a tort only when the parties
have a special relationship.' 3' While an insured shares a special
relationship with his insurer, the converse is not true. The insurer's
superior economic position frees it from the fear of oppression and the
risk of financial harm burdening an insured. 32 Comparing the parties'
respective causes of action and remedies to "apples and
oranges," the
33
Stephens court reinstated the plaintiffs' entire verdict.
Not all courts, however, have rejected comparative bad faith and
comparative fault. At least a few courts have sensed that in bad faith
cases, "the fact finder, in its search for truth, should be able to look at
the whole forest and not just a few of the trees. This should include a
view of the insured's conduct as well .. .
For instance, despite the Stephens decision, Montana has effectively
recognized comparative fault when it was not so described. In
Juedeman v. NationalFarmersUnion Property & Casualty Co., 35 the
insured, the mother of a minor child, refused to release the estate of the
deceased driver in whose vehicle her son was injured. The decedent's
insurer offered the plaintiff its $100,000 policy limits if she would
release the insured's estate from any future loss of consortium claim,
in addition to her son's claim. 36 When she refused to execute a

128. Id. at 567.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 568; accord California Fair Plan Ass'n v. Politi, 270 Cal. Rptr. 243, 246
(Ct. App. 1990).
131. Stephens v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 852 P.2d 565, 568 (Mont. 1993) (quoting
Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775 (Mont. 1990)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 569.
134. Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 844 S.W.2d 808, 832 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992) (Biery, J.,concurring), rev'd, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
135. 833 P.2d 191 (Mont. 1992).
136. Id. at 192.
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complete release, the insurer refused to settle the claim by paying its
policy limits.'37
The plaintiff then sued the insurer for violating the Montana Unfair
Claim Practices Act by refusing to promptly and fairly settle a claim for
which its insured was clearly liable. 3 ' The trial court granted the
insurer's summary judgment motion and the Supreme Court of
Montana affirmed. The Juedeman court reasoned that the plaintiffs
conduct prevented the insurer from promptly and fairly resolving her
claim.'39 The court further noted that precedent compelled it to reject
an insurance bad faith claim "where the plaintiff s conduct caused the
delay in payment.""
A California court explicitly recognized comparative fault as an
affirmative defense to an insurer's alleged bad faith in Patrick v.
Maryland Casualty Co. 4 ' In Patrick, the plaintiff purchased
homeowner's insurance from Maryland Casualty. In December,
1982, windstorms blew shingles from a portion of the plaintiffs roof.
The plaintiff temporarily repaired the roof to prevent further damage
and submitted a claim. Thereafter, the parties' versions of events
differed. Maryland Casualty claimed that the plaintiff was in no hurry
to resolve the claim, that he communicated no sense of urgency about
its payment, and that he mailed in the claim rather than hand-delivering
it or calling. Maryland Casualty asserted that it acted reasonably on the
claim once it was received. 41 2 The plaintiff alleged that he told the
adjuster that water was pouring through holes in the roof and that he
needed money to make necessary repairs. The scenario then went
from bad to worse, according to the plaintiff:
[Maryland Casualty], however, forced him to get needless
documentation and estimates which caused seemingly endless
delays; then told him the check was in the mail; then told him
the check must have been lost; and then delayed further in
issuing another one. As a result of this delay, three months later
in early March of 1983 after further water damage to his house,
[plaintiff] called . . . again to complain that he still needed the
money, and that water damage to his house was continuing ....
[Plaintiff], who was a carpenter . . . then got up on the roof
again to do the necessary repairs himself. He claimed that
137.
138.
139.
140.
1987)).
141.
142.

Id. at 193.
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193.
Id. (citing Spadaro v. Midland Claims, Inc., 740 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Mont.
267 Cal. Rptr. 24 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 26.
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[Maryland Casualty's] employee had told him to do this work
himself, although he also later admitted that doing the work
himself might have been his own idea after all.
In any event, once he got up on the roof again, [plaintiff]
decided . ..he would need to replace the entire roof . ... He

went out to buy the necessary supplies, then later returned.
he lost his
While he was walking backward on the roof .
balance and had to jump eight feet down onto the sidewalk.
Both of his heels were severely injured

. . .

.He presented

he has been disabled from his
evidence showing that as a result
143
job as a carpenter ever since.
One of the causes submitted to the jury was Maryland Casualty's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' 44 The
trial court refused the insurer's request that the jury be instructed to
assess the fault of the parties by comparing its bad faith with the
plaintiff's negligence. 45 The jury returned a plaintiff's verdict,
awarding both compensatory and punitive damages, and Maryland
Casualty appealed.
The appellate court reversed. 46 The court first noted that while
comparative fault had not previously been considered by an appellate
147
court, the absence of precedent was not a good reason to reject it.
Indeed, it noted, most defenses now recognized in tort cases were
once novel. 4 8 Second, the court saw no reason to reject the defense
when it was recognized in products liability actions, in which a
plaintiff's negligence is compared against a manufacturer's strict
liability. 149 "While the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises out of
a contractual relationship, [its] breach ...

and the ensuing damages

are governed by tort principles."' 5 ° Third, California courts already
allowed the comparison of fault attributable to negligence and willful
misconduct in personal injury actions. "' 1 Thus, as previously noted in
the products liability context, the court found that such a comparison
appeared legally sound.
143.
144.

Id.
See id.

145.

Id. at 27.

146.

Id.

147. Id. at 28.
148. Id. (quoting California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 218 Cal. Rptr. 817,
821 (Ct. App. 1985)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The application of comparative fault principles to negligent conduct on one
hand and willful misconduct on the other was announced in Sorensen v. Allred, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 441 (Ct. App. 1980).
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Finally, the court reasoned that comparative fault "may not always
be avoided by plaintiff's unilateral manipulation of the mere
denomination of his claim where the defendant contends that, if there
was any liability at all, it arose as a result of negligence; and where that
theory is supported by the evidence."'' 52 The Patrick court thus
concluded that comparative negligence may be available as an
affirmative defense in an action for an insurer's bad faith.'53
In California State Automobile Ass'n. Inter-InsuranceBureau v.
Bales, 54 a plaintiff's attorney's actions were at issue. Bales, the
attorney, was hired in 1983 by an elderly plaintiff, Dorothy Cooper, to
prosecute her personal injury claim against California State Automobile
Inter-Insurance Bureau's (CSAA) insured. Bales did not energetically
pursue the claim, he refused to negotiate a settlement with CSAA, and
he failed to seek an early trial date, to which Cooper's age entitled
her. 55 That action against CSAA's insured was finally settled in May,
1987. In December, 1987, represented by new counsel, Cooper sued
CSAA for bad faith, alleging that it failed to settle her personal injury
action promptly despite its insured's clear liability156
CSAA pleaded Bales' negligence in handling Cooper's personal
injury claim as an affirmative defense. 57 CSAA also cross-claimed
against Bales for implied equitable indemnity, alleging that Bales was
largely responsible for the delays that led to Cooper's claimed
argued, Bales should pay his comparative
damages. Therefore, CSAA
58
damages.
those
of
share
The trial court dismissed CSAA's cross-claim and the court of
appeals affirmed. The Bales appellate court reasoned that, in such
circumstances, allowing insurers' pursuit of implied equitable
indemnity claims would create conflicts of interests for plaintiffs'
personal injury counsel:
Where the attorney represents either a first or third party
claimant on an insurance policy, the interest of the client is
necessarily adverse to that of the insurer, even though there may
not be any underlying action against the insurer. In such
situations, there is a possibility that conduct of the insurer may
subject it to liability for bad faith. That possibility in turn
creates a potential conflict between the attorney's duty to pursue
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Patrick v. Maryland Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 30.
270 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 422.
Id. at 422-23.
See id. at 424.
Id. at423.
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the client's claim vigorously, and the understandable desire to
avoid conduct which might later be the basis for the attorney's
personal liability in indemnity to the insurer. An attorney who
believed that the insurer had engaged or was about to engage in
bad faith claims practices might well choose to avoid such
liability by acting to shield the insurer, even
though his or her
59
client would be ill-served by such action.'
The appellate court did, however, recognize the validity of CSAA's
affirmative defense.' 60 Bales thus expanded the comparative fault
doctrine to allow a comparison of plaintiffs' or insureds' counsel's
conduct.
The concept of comparative bad faith surfaced in Fleming v. Safeco
Insurance Co. of America, Inc. 161 The Fleming plaintiff was severely
injured when the car in which she was a passenger was struck by a
stolen vehicle. At the time of the accident she maintained uninsured
motorist coverage with Safeco, with policy limits of $15,000. Safeco
offered $10,000 to settle her claim, which she rejected. The matter
was ultimately resolved by a $15,000 arbitration award more than one
year after the accident. 62
After payment of the arbitration award, the plaintiff sued Safeco for
compensatory and punitive damages on the ground that Safeco had
been guilty of bad faith, as well as malicious and oppressive conduct
in the handling of her claim. 163 A jury returned a verdict in the
plaintiffs favor, awarding her gross compensatory damages totaling
$14,300. The jury determined that twenty-six percent of plaintiff's
compensatory damages were attributable to her bad faith conduct and
seventy-four percent were attributable to Safeco's bad faith conduct.
64
The jury also awarded the plaintiff $116,500 in punitive damages.
The court observed that the comparison of the parties' bad faith was
unprecedented, but because neither party objected to the related special
verdict form, and because neither party chose to address the issue on
appeal, its propriety need not be discussed. 65 Safeco did contend on
appeal that the punitive award should be reduced by its insured's bad
faith, as were the compensatory damages. The Fleming court rejected
the argument, noting that "bad faith on the one hand, and malice,
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 424.
206 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 321.
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oppression, or fraud on the other hand are not equivalents, and any
attempt to compare them would amount to a comparison of apples and
oranges."' 6 6
An Arizona court reached a different conclusion in Borland v.
Safeco Insurance Co. of America.167 In deciding whether to allow an
award of punitive damages against the defendant insurer, the Borland
court "also [thought] it proper to consider the insured's conduct."' 68
The Borland plaintiff had almost immediately consulted with a
knowledgeable insurance attorney upon delay in the payment of her
claim. There was understandable confusion concerning coverage, and
the plaintiff and her attorney were of no help in resolving questions.
In fact, the plaintiff's attorney, although well-versed in insurance
matters, "stood by and permitted the [insurer] to fumble its way into
difficulty without seriously trying to straighten things out.' ' 169 As a
result, the court struck the plaintiff's punitive damages award.
170
In CaliforniaCasualty General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,
a California court finally adopted the defense of comparative bad faith.
The plaintiff insured in California Casualty allegedly suffered a loss
compensable under the uninsured motorist coverage provided in her
automobile insurance policy. After California Casualty declined to pay
the plaintiff's claim, she pursued the matter through arbitration and
received a favorable award. She then sued California Casualty for its
alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and certain statutory
violations.17 ' The insurer sought leave to amend its answer to include
an affirmative defense of comparative bad faith by the plaintiff and her
former attorney in the handling and management of her claim. 7 2 The
trial court denied the insurer's motion and the issue reached the court
of appeal by writ of mandamus.
The plaintiff contended that there existed no authority recognizing
affirmative comparative bad faith as an affirmative defense to an action
166. Id.
167. 709 P.2d 552 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
168. Id. at 558. In Borland, the plaintiffs house was burglarized the day after her
policy with Safeco expired. Id. at 553. Even though the plaintiff had insured herself
through a new insurer, she also extended her coverage with Safeco through a grace period
of renewal. Id. Delays and confusion resulted when Safeco personnel did not know that
the policy had been renewed or to what extent the loss was covered by the second
insurer. Id. at 555.
169. Id
170. 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
171. Id. at 818.
172. Id. at 819.
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for an insurer's bad faith. Thus, the comparative bad faith defense
was not legally cognizable or, at the very most, constituted a
"disfavored" defense. 7 3 The court easily rejected the plaintiff's
argument:
Plaintiff's assertion that the defense of "comparative bad faith"
would constitute a "disfavored" defense is not persuasive and,
indeed, is a bit puzzling. If, as plaintiff[] seem[s] to suggest, the
fact that "comparative bad faith" has not been heretofore
recognized in a published appellate opinion as a partial or
complete defense to a bad faith action renders it a "disfavored"
defense, we reject that suggestion. Presumably, most defenses
now recognized in tort cases were at one time novel and not
expressly recognized in published judicial decisions.
"Disfavored" defenses are such because of public policy
considerations, not because they are novel. 74
The CaliforniaCasualty court was persuaded that, "in an appropriate
case, an insured's breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing which contributes to an insurer's" timely resolution of the
subject claim may constitute at least a partial affirmative defense to the
insurer's alleged breach.17 1 In so holding, the court noted that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing is a two-way street. 176 Moreover, "[t]he
specific content of each party's duty is 'dependent upon the nature of
the bargain struck between the insurer and the insured and the
legitimate expectations of the parties which arise from the contract."" 77
There could be little question, the court observed, that an insurer
providing uninsured motorist coverage has a reasonable expectation
that the insured suffering a loss will promptly and accurately furnish
all known evidence and information pertinent to the claim.7 8 If an
insured's failure to do so delays or impedes the insurer's investigation
or payment of the claim, the court reasoned, there existed no sound
reason that the doctrine of comparative fault should not be applied to
bad faith cases. 179 Accordingly, the appellate court permitted the
insurer to amend its answer and clearly80allege the affirmative defense
of the insured's comparative bad faith.
173. Id. at 820.
174. Id. at 821.
175. Id. at 822.
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Commercial Union Assur. Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 610 P.2d
1038, 1041 (Cal. 1980)).
178. Id. at 822-23.
179. Id. at 823.
180. Some commentators suggest that California Casualty actually limits the scope
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B. The Insured'sFailureto Cooperate
Insureds' comparative bad faith or comparative fault is necessarily
related to insureds' express contractual duties to cooperate with their
insurers. Cooperation clauses in liability insurance policies obligate
insureds to assist insurers in the conduct and defense of third-party
actions.' 8 ' In any given case an insured must attend depositions,
hearings, and trials; assist in discovery; participate in or support
settlement negotiations; and enforce the insurer's subrogation rights. 182
First-party insurance policies impose specific obligations on the
insured that effectively require the insured's cooperation. These
policies routinely require insureds to allow the insurer's inspection of
property, submit to examinations under oath, and produce otherwise
confidential documents or records. 83 An insured may also be required
of comparative bad faith to the insured's personal acts or to those acts committed with
the insured's actual authority. Anderson, supra note 19, at 508 & n.172. That is
probably an overstatement, however. The California Casualty court simply observed
that an insured might bear liability for the authorized acts of her agents and, similarly,
that the conduct of the insured's attorneys or others that cannot be imputed to the insured
will not defeat or diminish the insured's recovery. California Casualty, 218 Cal. Rptr. at
822. This is nothing more than traditional agency analysis. Applying traditional
agency law principles, the bad faith conduct of the insured's attorney generally should
be imputed to the insured. Anderson, supra note 19, at 509-10. The insurer need only
establish that the attorney had apparent authority to act on the insured's behalf. Id. at
510. Presumably, there are other persons who, if acting in bad faith on the insured's
behalf, will see their actions imputed to the insured. Such agents of the insured might
include, without limitation, public adjusters, insurance brokers, contractors and
accountants.
181. In re Environmental Ins. Declaratory Judgment Actions, 612 A.2d 1338, 1342
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
182. See Forest City Grant Liberty Assocs. v. Genro 11, Inc., 652 A.2d 948, 951-52
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (insured must provide insurer with information necessary to
prepare defense, aid in securing witnesses' appearance, attend hearings and trials, and
otherwise "render all reasonable assistance necessary"); In re Environmental Insurance,
612 A.2d at 1342 ("[llnsureds are generally required to provide all such information and
assistance as the insurer may require.")
183. See generally KHD Deutz of Am. Corp. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 469 S.E.2d 336,
338-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (failure to communicate with insurer breached cooperation
clause); Owens v. Allstate Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 368, 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (failure to
communicate with insurer was breach of cooperation clause); Watson v. National Sur.
Corp., 468 N.W.2d 448 (Iowa 1991) (insurer's performance excused by insured's failure
to timely submit to examination under oath); Mello v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 656
N.E.2d 1247 (Mass. 1995) (insured breached cooperation clause by refusing to submit to
examination under oath even though he risked incriminating himself in concurrent
criminal investigation); DiFrancisco v. Chubb Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 1027 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995) (insured's failure to produce tax returns and business records constituted
breach of cooperation clause); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gruzlewski, 630 N.Y.S.2d 826,
826 (App. Div. 1995) (insured breached cooperation clause by failing to turn over
documents and by failing to appear for examination); Fineberg v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 438 S.E.2d 754, 755 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (insured failed to satisfy policy
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to submit
to a physical examination by a doctor of the insurer's
84
choice.
An insurer may require its insured to abide by the terms of its
policy, including a cooperation clause. 8 5 The insured's and the
86
insurer's obligations under the cooperation clause are reciprocal.'1
The insured must cooperate with the insurer and the insurer must
exercise reasonable diligence in obtaining the insured's cooperation.' 87
An insured's substantial and material breach of its duty to cooperate
terminates the insurer's obligations only when the insured's conduct
prejudices the insurer. 88 An insurer may use an insured's failure to
cooperate to defend against a bad faith claim where the insurer has
concluded its investigation or withdrawn its defense. 89 Whether an
insurer has been prejudiced is ordinarily a question of fact. 190 The

consideration by failing to submit to examination under oath), review denied, 445
S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 1994); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Walker, 459 N.W.2d 605, 609
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (Fifth Amendment did not prevent insured from answering
insurer's arson-related questions under oath).
184. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Porter, 390 S.E.2d 742, 743 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
185. See, e.g., Diamonds & Denims, Inc. v. First of Georgia Ins. Co., 417 S.E.2d
440, 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
186. See American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Chandler Mfg. Co., 467 N.W.2d 226,
229 (Iowa 1991); Thompson v. West Va. Essential Property Ins. Ass'n, 411 S.E.2d 27,
34 (W. Va. 1991) (observing that duty to cooperate under policy "is a two-way street").
187. See, e.g., American Guaranty, 467 N.W.2d at 229; Riffe v. Peeler, 684 S.W.2d
539, 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burr, 641 N.Y.S.2d 69,
70 (App. Div. 1996); Bowyer v. Thomas, 423 S.E.2d 906, 911 (W. Va. 1992).
188. Compare S.G. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 460 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990) (must be "a 'substantial and material breach") (emphasis added) and
Templin v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 611 N.E.2d 944, 946 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (requiring
material and substantial breach) (emphasis added) with Brown v. Employer's
Reinsurance Corp., 539 A.2d 138, 142 (Conn. 1988) (requiring "substantial or material
breach of the cooperation provisions") (emphasis added). See also Harris v. Prudential
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 632 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Del. 1993) (requiring "substantial"
breach).
Courts generally hold that the key issue is whether an insured's conduct prejudiced the
insurer. See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp.
1136, 1160 (D.N.J. 1993), aff'd, 89 F.3d 976 (3d Cir. 1996); King v. Federal Ins. Co.,
788 F. Supp. 506, 506-07 (D. Kan. 1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1993); Eldin
v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 823, 827-29 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994);
Pickwick Park Ltd. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co., 602 A.2d 515, 518-19 (R.I. 1992); Charles
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 452 S.E.2d 384, 389 (W. Va. 1994).
189. See Cherry v. Anthony, 501 So. 2d 416, 420 (Miss. 1987) ("[I]t is difficult to
see how the insurance adjuster can be faulted for bad faith when it is clear that the
[insureds] did not cooperate with him in his investigation.").
190. See, e.g., Sequoia Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 971 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th
Cir. 1992) (applying California law); Gabor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583
N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
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insurer bears the burden of proving the insured's breach of the
cooperation clause. 9'
Factual differences in individual cases make it impossible to
formulate a bright-line rule regarding particular acts as evidence of
failure to cooperate. Prejudice results where the insured's conduct
prevents the insurer from adequately investigating or defending a
claim. 9 2 The insurer may carry its burden if it can show that the
insured's cooperation would have allowed it to negate liability.
Similarly, the subsequent discovery of key evidence previously
unknown because of the insured's failure to cooperate might establish
that the outcome would have been different had the insured
cooperated. 93 In first-party cases, an insured's refusal to produce
records or to
submit to an examination under oath generally invalidates
94
coverage. 1
Among the more unusual non-cooperation cases is National
ChiropracticMutual Insurance Co. v. Cannon.195 Cannon illustrates
the sort of conduct that might support a comparative bad faith defense.
In Cannon, chiropractor Donald Cannon (Cannon) was sued for
malpractice in a California state court. Cannon tendered his defense to
National Chiropractic Mutual Insurance Co. (NCMIC). Ultimately,
the malpractice plaintiffs prevailed; however, Cannon's conduct
significantly contributed to their success. Cannon refused to consent
to settlement, fired NCMIC's chosen defense counsel shortly before
trial, failed to obtain substitute counsel, attempted to remove the case
to federal court, and failed to appear at trial.' 96
NCMIC filed an interpleader action in federal court seeking a
declaratory judgment absolving it of liability in excess of its policy
limits. 97 Cannon counterclaimed for NCMIC's breach of its duty of
good faith and fair dealing. 98 The district court held that NCMIC
breached its duty of good faith to Cannon in connection with the
191. See, e.g., Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (N.D. I11. 1994),
dismissed, 47 F.3d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Page, 873 S.W.2d
534, 536 (Ark. 1994); Union Warehouse and Supply Co. v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc.,
917 P.2d 1300, 1306 (Idaho 1996); Woodfin Equities Corp. v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co.,
678 A.2d 116, 135-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
192. See Reid v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 17 F.3d 1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1994)
(interpreting Missouri law).
193. ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 425 (1987).
194. See, e.g., Brown v. Danish Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 550 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1996).
195. Nos. 89-15903, 89-16013, 1991 WL 39887 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 1991).
196. Id. at *2.
197. Id. at*1.
198. Id.
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underlying malpractice action by failing to inform him of a conflict of
interest and his right to engage independent counsel of his choice. 99
The court further held, however, that Cannon's bizarre conduct
constituted a breach of his duty to cooperate in NCMIC's defense. 2"
In fact, the court determined that Cannon's conduct was unreasonable
as a matter of law and proximately caused the malpractice award. 20 '
The district court entered summary judgment for NCMIC, and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 2
IV. REVERSE BAD FAITH
If an insurer may assert its insured's bad faith as an affirmative
defense, may it similarly sue its insured for a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing? In other words, does an insured's breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing provide a basis for the
insurer's affirmative relief? If the duty of good faith and fair dealing
truly is a "two-way street," should mutual duties come with mutual
remedies? Assuming the answer to this last question is "yes," an
insurer suing its insured in tort for alleged bad faith may be said to be
pursuing a "reverse bad faith" claim.20 3
In one of the few reverse bad faith cases reported, First Lehigh
Bank v. North River Insurance Co., 20 4 a federal district court in
Pennsylvania rejected the cause of action. In FirstLehigh, the plaintiff
bank sued North River to recover under a banker's blanket bond for a
loss attributable to employee fraud. North River counterclaimed under
three theories, including the bank's alleged breach of its duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 5
The First Lehigh Bank filed a claim with North River, alleging that
it suffered a loss of approximately $400,000 due to an employee's
dishonest acts. The bank claimed that the employee concealed and
entered into unauthorized loan transactions. North River began its
investigation and requested copies of minutes from directors'
meetings, loan reports, and FDIC examination reports.20 6 The bank
informed North River that the information sought was confidential and
that it would have to enter into a related confidentiality agreement. The
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Richmond, supra note 23, at 64.
No. CIV.A.88-7746, 1989 WL 146654 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1989).
Id. at *1.
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parties attempted to negotiate a resolution, but, before reaching
agreement, the bank sued North River to collect its claim.20 7 After a
consent protective order was entered, discovery got underway. The
bank provided North River with records apparently unrelated to the
unauthorized loans at issue. North River later discovered that the
records were altered before their production. 0 8 The insurer alleged
that all references to the loans purportedly unauthorized or concealed
were deleted, that loan reports reflecting a fraudulent letter of credit
transaction were prepared, and that minutes of meetings were altered to
reflect the dishonest employee's termination.2tm
North River's counterclaim for the bank's alleged breach of its duty
of good faith and fair dealing posed a novel issue for the FirstLehigh
court. 2'0 The court recognized that "'the utmost fair dealing should
characterize the transaction between an insurance company and the
insured.""'2 " The court nonetheless dismissed North River's
counterclaim. While the bank's breach of its duty of good faith might
permit North River to avoid liability under its bond, it would not
support a separate claim by North River for money damages. 2 2 The
FirstLehigh court offered no reasoning for its conclusion. The court
noted, however, that North River remained free to sue the bank for
malicious use of process should it prevail in the pending suit 21 s
Ohio rejected the reverse bad faith doctrine in Tokles & Son, Inc. v.
Midwestern Indemnity Co. 1 4 The Midwestern Indemnity plaintiff
sued its insurer for breach of contract and bad faith when it denied the
plaintiff's claim for the theft of a truck.2"5 Midwestern counterclaimed
for fraud and the insured's reverse bad faith. a 6 The case proceeded to
a bifurcated trial, with the insured's breach of contract claim being
tried first. The insurer obtained a directed verdict and after the trial
obtained summary judgment on the insured's bad faith claim. The trial
court then dismissed sua sponte Midwestern's reverse bad faith
counterclaim.2 7
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.at *2.
211. Id. at *4 (quoting Dercoli v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 554 A.2d 906,
909 (Pa. 1989)).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 605 N.E.2d 936 (Ohio 1992).
215. Id.at 939.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict and the
insurer's summary judgment on the bad faith claim, and it affirmed the
dismissal of Midwestern's counterclaim. 18 The Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed the intermediate appellate court in part and reversed it in
part. 219 The supreme court refused to recognize the tort of reverse bad
faith 2 20° reasoning that the insurer, who invariably has a superior
bargaining position, is not in need of a reverse bad faith cause of
action.22 ' The Midwestern Indemnity court offered no other bases for
its rejection of the insurer's reverse bad faith proposition.
Iowa recently rejected a reverse bad faith cause of action in Johnson
v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.2 12 In Johnson, plaintiffs
Verdell and Marian Johnson sued Iowa Lakes Electric Cooperative
when Marian was seriously injured by a downed power line on their
property. Iowa Lakes crossclaimed against Verdell, alleging his
comparative fault. Mr. Johnson tendered the crossclaim to his liability
insurer, Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau denied coverage because the
claim fell squarely within an exclusion in its policy.223 Specifically,
the Farm Bureau policy excluded from coverage bodily injury to
insureds, including spouses and relatives.224
The jury in the underlying personal injury action returned a verdict
of approximately $690,000 in favor of the Johnsons. The jury
apportioned eighty percent of the fault to Iowa Lakes and twenty
percent to Mr. Johnson. Iowa Lakes paid the judgment in full and was

218. Id. The Ohio Court of Appeals' decision is reported only on electronic
databases. See Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., No. L-89-395, 1991 WL
355145 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1991).
219. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the directed
verdict, reversed relative to summary judgment on the bad faith claim, and reversed the
judgment upholding the trial court's dismissal of Midwestern's counterclaim. Tokles,
605 N.E.2d at 940-45.
220. Id. at 945.
221. Id. Specifically, the court stated:
As the holder of the purse strings, the insurer has a certain built-in protection
from such evils. On the other hand, the insured, who often finds himself in
dire financial straits after the loss, must have the equal footing which is
provided by the ability to sue the insurer for bad faith. There are other avenues
for the insurer to pursue in the event that an insured submits a fraudulent claim.
An insurer drafts the policy, can refuse the insured's claim, and could assert a
cause of action against the insured for fraud.
Id.
222. 533 N.W.2d 203 (Iowa 1995).
223. Id. at 205.
224. Id. at 206-07.
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then awarded judgment for contribution against Verdell for his
percentage of fault. 2
Mr. Johnson then sued Farm Bureau for breach of contract, alleging
that it should have defended and indemnified him against Iowa Lakes'
crossclaim. He also alleged that Farm Bureau's refusal to defend and
indemnify him amounted to bad faith.226 Farm Bureau
counterclaimed, alleging that Mr. Johnson's bad faith allegations
constituted reverse bad faith and an abuse of process.227
The trial court granted Farm Bureau's summary judgment motion on
Mr. Johnson's breach of contract and bad faith claims. 228 The
insurer's counterclaims went to trial. The trial court directed a verdict
against Farm Bureau on its reverse bad faith and abuse of process
claims without ruling on the viability of the insurer's reverse bad faith
cause of action. In short, the trial court held that Mr. Johnson's
conduct did not rise to the level of bad faith.229
Farm Bureau appealed both the reverse bad faith and abuse of
On appeal, Farm Bureau argued that the
process directed verdicts.
Supreme Court of Iowa should recognize a cause of action for reverse
bad faith favoring insurers when insureds pursue frivolous bad faith
claims. 23' Farm Bureau did not dispute insureds' right to pursue
breach of contract claims to enforce insurers' coverage obligations.
Rather, Farm Bureau objected "to the 'linking of a frivolous tort claim
to [Johnson's] contract claim in an attempt to gain unfair advantage"'
in what should be a simple breach of contract action.232 The insurer
pointed out that its coverage position was "fairly debatable," and hence
reasonable as demonstrated by its victory at the summary judgment
stage. Farm Bureau also argued that Mr. Johnson failed to study his
policy closely before alleging the company's bad faith, as evidenced
by the fact that he could not point to a single policy provision
supporting his argument that Farm Bureau acted unreasonably. Farm
Bureau thus contended that Johnson's allegations of bad faith were
themselves made in bad faith.233

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
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Appreciating that the Johnson court might find no common law
support for its position,234 Farm Bureau argued that the mutual
obligation of good faith, coupled with insurers' right to deny fairly
debatable first-party claims, favored adopting the tort of reverse bad
faith.235 The insurer further argued that judicial recognition of firstparty bad faith as an independent tort has given insureds an unfair
litigation advantage, creating the need for a counterbalancing reverse
bad faith cause of action.236 In response, the plaintiff argued that
recognizing a reverse bad faith cause of action was unnecessary. The
plaintiff asserted that court imposed sanctions and the abuse of process
cause of action afford insurers adequate remedies for frivolous firstparty bad faith claims.237
The Johnson court declined to adopt the tort of reverse bad faith.238
The court reasoned that sanctions available under the Iowa Rules of
Civil Procedure 239 provide an adequate remedy for insurers when
insureds pursue frivolous bad faith claims.24 ° When Farm Bureau
protested that sanctions are inadequate because courts so rarely impose
them, the Johnson court responded that a single published decision in
a medical malpractice case 241' demonstrated that "courts are willing to
impose sanctions when confronted with an appropriate case. 24 2
Finally, the Supreme Court went on to affirm the trial court's directed

234. This was a valid concern and was reflected in the Johnson court's comment that
it was "aware of no jurisdiction that has adopted the tort of reverse bad faith." Id. at 208.
235. Id. at 207.
236. Id. at 207-08.
237. Id. at 208.
238. Id.
239. Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 80(a), an attorney's signature on a pleading
or other court document constitutes the attorney's certification that he:
has read the motion, pleading, or other paper; that to the best of Counsel's
knowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause an unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Id. (quoting IOWA R. Civ. P. 80(a)). The Rule further provides for "an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party . .. the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the motion, pleading, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney fee." Id. (quoting IOWA R. Civ. P. 80(a)).
240. Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 208 .
241. The case cited by the Johnson court is Fields v. Iowa District Court, 468 N.W.2d
38 (Iowa 1991).
242. Johnson, 533 N.W.2d at 208.
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verdict in Mr. Johnson's favor on Farm Bureau's abuse of process
claim.243
Although courts have been reluctant to embrace reverse bad faith,
that does not mean that the doctrine is dead on arrival. In Snap-On
Tools Corp. v. FirstState Insurance Co.,'" a Wisconsin jury returned
a reverse bad faith verdict for the insurer. In Snap-On Tools, the
insured corporation and First State negotiated a "manuscript" policy. 245
The policy included a unique cooperation clause and a standard
definition of "occurrence." 246
In 1985, George Owens, a Snap-On dealer in California, sued
Snap-On for wrongfully terminating his dealership contract. Owens
alleged a variety of causes of action and pleaded his entitlement to both
compensatory and punitive damages. Under the terms of the policy,
Snap-On investigated and defended Owens' suit. Snap-On's in-house
counsel estimated the company's potential exposure at less than
$100,000, meaning that any potential loss would fall within SnapOn's self-insured retention (SIR). 247 Accordingly, Snap-On did not
notify First State of Owens' suit. Even after Owens presented his case
at trial and Snap-On's California trial counsel informed the company
243. Id. at 209.
244. No. 91-1356, 1993 WL 91563 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1993).
245. Id. at *1. A manuscript policy is an insurance policy written to include specific
coverages or conditions not included in standard policies.
246. See id. at *2. The cooperation clause read:
ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION OF THE INSURED:
The Company shall not be called upon to assume charge of the defense or
settlement of any claims made or suits brought or proceedings instituted
against the Insured. The Insured shall be responsible for the investigation and
defense of any claim made or suit brought or proceeding instituted against the
Insured to which this Contract applies. The Insured shall use diligence,
prudence and good faith in the investigation defense and settlement of all such
claims and shall not unreasonably refuse to settle any which, in the exercise of
sound judgment should be settled, provided, however, that the Insured shall
not make or agree to any settlement for any sum which would involve the
limits of the Company's liability hereunder without the approval of the
Company.
The Company shall have the right and shall be given the opportunity to
associate with the Insured in the defense and control of any claim, suit or
proceeding which involves or appears reasonably likely to involve the
Company and in which event the Insured and the Company shall cooperate in
all things in defense of such claim, suit or proceeding.
The Company, if it so elects and at its sole option, shall have the right to
assume complete control of any claim which appears likely to involve the
Company's limit of liability under this Contract.
Id.
247. Id. at *3.
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that its liability exposure might exceed $100,000, Snap-On still did not
notify First State. 4 '
The jury in Owens' case returned a verdict for the plaintiff and
assessed considerable damages against Snap-On. They awarded
Owens compensatory damages of $282,554 and punitive damages of
$6,567,000. The California trial court later reduced the punitive
damage award to $4,000,000.249
Snap-On notified First State of the claim and the verdict within a
week. First State immediately informed Snap-On that its policy would
not cover the punitive damage award. First State also engaged
California counsel to investigate the loss. 250 Meanwhile, Snap-On
settled the Owens lawsuit while First State was still investigating the
loss. Snap-On paid $1,000,000 to settle the punitive damage claim
and $300,000 to settle the claims on which compensatory damages
were awarded.2 5 1 Snap-On did not obtain First State's approval of the
settlement, and it did not inform First State of the settlement for several
weeks. 2 2 First State ultimately declined to indemnify Snap-On,
asserting that Owens' claim was not a covered "occurrence" as defined
in the policy, that Snap-On's notice of the loss was untimely, and that
Snap-On failed to obtain its approval before setting the claim with
Owens.253
Snap-On responded by suing First State for bad faith and breach of
contract in Wisconsin, where Snap-On was headquartered. 4 Both
parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court entered
2 55
summary judgment for Snap-On on its breach of contract claim.
After several attempts to reverse the entry of summary judgment for
Snap-On (with corresponding damages of $900,000), First State
counterclaimed. First State alleged that Snap-On had breached the
fiduciary obligations inherent in its manuscript policy and that SnapOn acted in bad faith.256 First State sought both compensatory and
punitive damages in its counterclaim.
A lengthy trial was conducted on Snap-On's bad faith claim against
First State, and on First State's breach of fiduciary duty and bad faith
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.

132

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

counterclaims against Snap-On. The jury awarded Snap-On $250,000
257
in compensatory damages, but it did not award punitive damages.
The jury also found that Snap-On acted in bad faith. The jury awarded
First State $500,000 in compensatory damages. The jury further
found that Snap-On had acted maliciously, or in wanton and willful or
reckless disregard of its insurer's rights, and awarded First State
$4,000,000 in punitive damages.258 Both parties appealed.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the acts giving rise to
Owens' suit did not constitute an "occurrence., 259 The court further
held that Owens' damages were not attributable to "personal injury" as
defined in the policy. 260 The Snap-On Tools court thus concluded that
the trial court erred in denying First State's summary judgment
motion. 26' Because all of the other issues raised on appeal arose after
the erroneous denial of First State's motion for summary judgment on
the fundamental issue of coverage, the Snap-On Tools court deemed
them "extraneous to the disposition of [the] case," and declined to
address them.262
The Snap-On Tools court's failure to address First State's reverse
bad faith claim is unfortunate. While it is true that First State's reverse
bad faith claim did not become an issue until after the erroneous denial
of its summary judgment motion, it still was harmed by its insured's
bad faith conduct. At the very least, Snap-On's reverse bad faith
caused First State to incur unnecessary defense costs and related
expenses. The insurer should have been entitled to compensatory
damages in some amount notwithstanding its successful coverage
defense. The Snap-On Tools court apparently failed to appreciate or
understand the difference between the affirmative defense of
comparative bad faith, and the insurer's independent cause of action
for reverse bad faith.263
In contrast, a Texas trial court embraced reverse bad faith in Pioneer
Chlor Alkali Co. v. United Capitol Insurance Co. 26 4 The Pioneer
insured sued United Capitol in a declaratory judgment action arising
out of the release of chlorine gas at the insured's Nevada chemical
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at *8-*9.
260. Id. at *9.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Anderson, supra note 19, at 531 (stating that the court failed to appreciate the
distinction between comparative bad faith and the tort of reverse bad faith).
264. No. 91-22014 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris County, Dec. 30, 1994), reported in 9
MEALEY'S L1TI. REPORTS: INS. No. 10, H-I (Jan. 10, 1995).
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plant. The insured also alleged United Capitol's breach of contract,
bad faith, fraud, and misrepresentation.265 The United Capitol policy
at issue contained an absolute
pollution exclusion which clearly
2 66
lOSS.
the
for
coverage
excluded
The presence and effect of the absolute exclusion were known, or
should have been known, to the insured. The insured's prior policies
contained absolute pollution exclusions.267 Additionally, the insured's
broker advised it nearly one year before the loss that it had no pollution
26
coverage because of the absolute pollution exclusion in its policy. 8
Despite knowledge that the occurrence was not covered, the insured
prosecuted its action against United Capitol for nearly two years. The
insured ultimately dismissed United Capitol on the first day of trial.
The case then went to trial before the court on the insurer's claims for
attorneys' fees under a Texas rule penalizing parties who prosecute
groundless actions in bad faith.269
The Pioneer court concluded that the insured had, indeed,
prosecuted a groundless action in bad faith.27° It therefore entered
judgment against the insured in the amount of $241,500, a sum which
represented both the insurer's attorneys' fees and sanctions.27'
Although Pioneer has little precedential value as a trial court
judgment, it is a potentially important opinion because the court clearly
expresses its pro-insurer rationale.272 Pioneer is also significant
because the court's reasoning easily translates to other cases and
disputes.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD
Continued travel on the two-way street of insurance good faith
necessitates an examination of those situations that litigants are most
likely to encounter. Whether examining insureds' bad faith in the
third-party or first-party context, or whether asserting the insured's
bad faith as an affirmative defense or as an independent cause of action
seeking redress, it is useful to identify certain common scenarios.
Once those scenarios are identified, the relative merits of insureds' and
insurers' positions are open to debate.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 9 (West 1996)).
Id.
Id.
Goldman, supra note 23, at 37.
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A. Identifying Situations in Which the Insured's Conduct
DetrimentallyAffects the Insurer'sRights
An insured may conduct himself or itself in such a way as to
detrimentally affect an insurer's rights in both the third-party and the
first-party context.
1. Third-Party Categories
An insured's conduct may detrimentally affect a liability insurer's
rights in two situations. First, after the underlying occurrence, the
insured's conduct may impair the insurer's ability to adjust, defend, or
settle the claim.273 Second, after the carrier commits an act of bad
faith, the insured's actions may enlarge or enhance the damages
attributable to the insurer's wrongful conduct.7
Conduct falling into the first category is easily illustrated. For
example, an insured might attempt to conceal evidence or persuade
friendly witnesses to mislead the insurer in an attempt to conceal
coverage defenses. An insured with a SIR, with a policy right to
consent to settlement, or with special account instructions giving it a
settlement voice, might negligently or recklessly handle settlement
negotiations and expose an insurer to liability that it would have
otherwise avoided.
Assume that a commercial insured has a $100,000 SIR, with
$1,000,000 in liability coverage above its retained limit. The insured
is sued by an invitee who is seriously injured on the insured's
property. The insured likely bears some fault for the plaintiff's injury.
The plaintiff ultimately offers to settle the case for $85,000. The
insured has every incentive to try the case, because its potential liability
is capped at $100,000, while a jury may return a verdict considerably
less than the plaintiff's offer. The insured's potential reward is far
greater than its potential risk. The insurer, on the other hand, wants
the insured to accept the plaintiff's settlement offer. If the insured
accepts the plaintiffs offer, the insurer avoids all liability. In short,
this is the stereotypical third-party bad faith scenario, but with the
insured's and the insurer's roles reversed.
Alternatively, an insured may delay reporting an accident to an
insurer. As a result of that delay, potentially valuable evidence is lost
or destroyed, or important witnesses disappear. When the aggrieved
third-party actually files suit, the loss of evidence or witnesses'

273. Pryor, supra note 23, at 1510.
274. Id.
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disappearance impairs the insurer's ability to effectively defend its
insured.
Excess carriers might be prejudiced by an insured's post-occurrence
conduct as well. For example, an insured might negotiate special
account instructions with its primary insurer that give it the right to
control the defense and settlement of certain categories of claims or
suits. The insured may aggressively defend a suit in which the
damages threaten to invade the excess coverage even when reason
compels settlement within the primary policy's limits. Given its
unreasonable view of the defensibility of the action, the insured may
see no need to alert the excess insurer to the suit or the threat it poses
until the eve of trial. Absent timely notice, of which it has now been
deprived, the excess carrier cannot reasonably evaluate its exposure or
step in to defend or settle the case.
As for the second category of insureds' conduct, the archetypal
example is a collusive settlement following an insurer's mistaken
decision not to defend the insured. The insured and the plaintiff may
then be free to enter into a settlement or stipulate to a judgment in
which the plaintiff receives potential damages far exceeding any likely
jury award in exchange for a covenant not to execute on the insured's
personal assets.
2. First-Party Categories
In the first-party context, an insured's conduct may prejudice an
insurer in at least three situations. First, the insured's conduct may
increase the severity or the probability of the underlying loss."'
Second, the insured's conduct may impair the insurer's ability to
adjust or resolve the claim.276 Third, the insured's conduct may
breaches its
increase the size or severity of the loss after the 2insurer
7
dealing.
fair
and
faith
good
of
duty
its
or
contract,
An insured may increase the size or severity of the underlying loss
in the property insurance context by not maintaining the subject
property or by changing the property's use without the insurer's
knowledge or consent. An insured might allow commercial property
to deteriorate in order to drive out existing tenants, with a
corresponding increase in hazard. Or, an insured might misrepresent a
commercial property's intended use, causing the insurer to
underestimate the risk.
275.
276.
277.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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With respect to the second category of conduct, an insured might
conceal material facts from the insurer. An insured might also impair
an insurer's subrogation rights, leaving the insurer responsible for a
loss rightfully borne by a negligent third party.
Behavior falling into the third category can also pose problems for
insurers. Suppose that once property is damaged and the insurer
wrongfully refuses to pay, the insured determines that the insurer will
ultimately be liable for all damages causally linked to its conduct.
After the insurer's denial, then, the insured does not take steps to
minimize the loss, even though it plainly would be reasonable or
prudent to do so.
B. The Need to Recognize ComparativeFault and ComparativeBad
Faith as Affirmative Defenses
The policyholders' bar advances a number of reasons why insurers
should not be allowed to raise their insureds' comparative fault or
comparative bad faith as affirmative defenses. These arguments, while
valid to some extent, are not compelling.
The primary argument against the extension of comparative fault
principles to the insurance bad faith arena seems to be the
278
"disproportionate power of the parties to the [insurance] contract.
Policyholders' advocates often argue that the insurer-insured
relationship should not be compared to the relationships between
parties in typical comparative fault situations27 9 because insurers
generally draft the policies they sell without their insureds'
participation. In addition, insurers enjoy far superior bargaining
power. This unequal bargaining power could allow unscrupulous
insurers to take advantage of their insureds.28° Insurance policies are,
at base, adhesion contracts. 281' Additionally, insurers, not insureds,
are primarily responsible for discharging the insurance policy

278. Brothers, supra note 23, at 1566.
279. Id.
280. See Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir.
1992); Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 697-98 (Tex. 1994).
281. Courts routinely classify insurance policies as adhesion contracts. See, e.g.,
Bering Strait Sch. Dist. v. RLI Ins. Co., 873 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Alaska 1994);
Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 868 P.2d 510, 513 (Idaho Ct. App.
1994); Vierkant v. AMCO Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996);
Farmers Ins. Group v. Stonik, 867 P.2d 389, 391 (Nev. 1994); Sears Mortgage Corp. v.
Rose, 634 A.2d 74, 84 (N.J. 1993); Kief Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut.
Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 32 (N.D. 1995); Max True Plastering Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 864 (Okla. 1996).
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agreement.28 2 Thus, 283
insureds are not generally responsible for
performing the contract.
This traditional perspective is not uniformly true today. In many
instances, insurers no longer have the upper hand. 28 4 Average
insureds generally enjoy increased power resulting from the many
common law remedies available should an insurer act in bad faith.
Many states protect insureds from predatory insurers by way of unfair
claim practice statutes 285 or under consumer protection statutes. 286 "If
anything, the scales tend to tilt in favor of the insured given the
common law and statutory minefield that today's insurance companies
must navigate. 2 7
Commercial insureds with substantial assets and ready access to
legal services stand on equal footing with their insurers. 28 Large
commercial entities have significant bargaining power9 and are often
able to negotiate for manuscript policies, special account instructions,
and other favorable policy provisions. Such insureds often rely on
sophisticated brokers or knowledgeable risk managers to negotiate
their policies. The resulting policy is essentially bargained for at arms
length, and it is not an adhesion contract. 290 Thus, the rationale that
supports protecting individual insureds does not always transfer to the
Brothers, supra note 23, at 1566.
Id.
Anderson, supra note 19, at 515.
285. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.125 (Michie 1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
20-461 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §
10-3-1104 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816(6) (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(16) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155 (West 1986); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 431:13-103(a) (10) (1994); IDAHO CODE § 41-1329 (1994); 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/154.6 (West 1993) (formerly ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 766.6 (SmithHurd 1991)); IND. CODE § 27-4-1-4.5 (1994); IOWA CODE § 507B.4 (Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-2404 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436-A (West 1990);
MINN. STAT. § 72A.201 (Supp. 1996); Mo. REV. STAT. § 375.936 (1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 33-18-201 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1540 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. §
686A.310 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16-20 (Michie 1995); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2601
(Consol. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-15(11) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-0403(9) (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1250.5 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. §
746.230 (1995); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1171.5 (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 3859-20 (Law. Co-op. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-8-104(8) (1994); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. § 21.21-2 (West 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(9) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-510 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1996).
286. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1984); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 358-A:2 (1995).
287. Anderson, supra note 19, at 515.
288. See Slottow v. American Cas. Co., 10 F.3d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993);
Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 639 A.2d 1358, 1366 (R.I. 1994).
289. Livesay, supra note 23, at 1215.
290. Id. at 1216.
282.
283.
284.
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commercial context. Depending on the commercial insured's size,
sophistication, and wealth, there may be absolutely no need for judicial
favoritism.
The second argument against the application of comparative fault
principles to insurance bad faith is that insurers are already protected
from insureds' negligent or bad faith conduct by traditional contract
defenses.2 91 For example, an insurer might be able to defeat its
insured's bad faith claim by arguing that the insured breached the
cooperation clause in the policy, or that the insured failed to comply
with the policy's notice of loss or proof of loss requirements.292 An
insurer might also argue that the insured interfered with its subrogation
rights. Most fundamentally, an insurer might argue that there was no
coverage for the "occurrence" or loss at issue, and hence, it could not
have acted in bad faith.
Although superficially appealing, leaving insurers to their contract
defenses is practically and theoretically unsatisfactory for several
reasons. Initially it must be noted that insurers may be liable for bad
faith even in the absence of coverage for the underlying loss or
occurrence. 293 There may be situations, then, in which the insured's
conduct might be factually relevant to the insurer's alleged bad faith
conduct without qualifying as a contract defense. 9 Additionally, an
insured's conduct may not be deemed a material breach of a policy
291. Brothers, supra note 23, at 1567.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Viles v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990)
(first-party claim); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 506 (Wash. 1992)
(stating that an estoppel remedy offers better protection against an insurer's bad faith
conduct). Texas has cooled to the idea of bad faith in the absence of coverage since Viles
was decided. See Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995) (noting
that "as a general rule there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly
denied a claim that is in fact not covered"). However, the Stoker court acknowledged that
an insurer could commit an act so extreme that it could be liable for bad faith even if the
underlying claim were not covered. Id.
Bad faith in the absence of coverage is most likely to arise in those states that have
essentially imposed a "duty to investigate" on insurers. In those states, an insurer's
refusal to defend an insured without conducting a thorough investigation, or refusing to
pay or settle a claim without investigating, may breach the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. See Kervin v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 667 So. 2d 704, 705 (Ala.
1995); Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 227 (Ct. App.
1996); Lewis v. Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 187 (Miss. 1994); Dees v.
American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 861 P.2d 141, 149-50 (Mont. 1993); Ruwe v. Farmers
Mut. United Ins. Co., 469 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Neb. 1991); Gilderman v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 649 A.2d 941, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 661 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1995);
Williams v. Crum & Forster Commercial Ins., 915 S.W.2d 39, 43-45 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995).
294. Pryor, supra note 23, at 1526.
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provision such as a cooperation clause, yet it may still have influenced
the insurer's behavior. The insured's conduct would thus justify
comparison even if it did not provide an absolute policy defense.
Finally, if the insured's conduct occurs after the insurer acts in bad
faith, the insurer probably has no policy defenses. This is because the
insurer's breach of contract will excuse the insured's performance.2 95
Therefore, the insured's negligent or wrongful conduct would have no
defensive effect even when it directly bears on the harm for which the
insured seeks recovery.29 6 Simply put, an insured should not fully
recover when it partly or wholly caused the damages at issue.
Third, assuming that the insured's conduct is relevant to the
determination of the insurer's bad faith liability, the evidentiary effect
of the insured's conduct should be sufficient to safeguard the insurer's
interests. Critics of comparative fault and comparative bad faith in the
insurance realm contend that their application allows an insurer to use
identical evidence to demonstrate the reasonableness of its conduct
and, at the same time, compel a reduction in the insured's claimed
damages. 29' Allowing a reduction in the insured's damages because of
her bad faith, despite the insurer's bad faith conduct, provides an
insurer with two means of using the same evidence to its advantage.298
Comparative fault or comparative
bad faith essentially amounts to a
299
"double defense" for insurers.
This is perhaps the best argument against adopting comparative fault
and comparative bad faith. However, the argument is not universally
applicable. There may be situations in first-party cases in which the
insurer's wrongful denial of a claim is at least partly the insured's
fault. The fact that the insurer was at fault should not mean that the
insured avoids liability altogether; after all, the insured was not free of
fault.3°° In the case of liability insurance, a third party that sets up an
insurer for bad faith with a time-restricted settlement offer might be
able to argue that its conduct is irrelevant in the absence of a specific
affirmative defense of comparative bad faith or comparative fault.
On the other side of the coin, there are several forceful arguments to
be made for allowing insurers to compare their insureds' conduct in
bad faith litigation. First, recognizing affirmative defenses of
295. Id. at 1525.
296. Id. at 1527.
297. WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 2.03[2][b], at
2-22 (1993).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Pryor, supra note 23, at 1520.
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comparative fault and comparative bad faith is fundamentally fair. Any
award of damages should logically relate to the responsible parties'
conduct, not solely to the relationship between the parties. 30' Holding
insurers wholly liable for damages for which they are only partly
responsible, while allowing insureds to recover for self-inflicted harm,
offends all notions of equity and fairness.3"2 Comparative fault and
comparative bad faith promote fundamental fairness by apportioning
damages between responsible parties.30 3
Second, courts cannot logically ground the duty of good faith and
fair dealing in tort law and, at the same time, reject the concomitant and
well-established affirmative defense of comparative fault.3' 4 Fidelity
to legal doctrine requires that if the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing merits tort remedies for its breach, so must it be subject to tort
defenses.30 5 If courts are unwilling to recognize comparative fault and
comparative bad faith, they should abandon tort theory and treat an
insurer's bad faith as a breach of contract. 3°
Third, the application of comparative fault and comparative bad faith
takes nothing away from blameless insureds, nor does it appreciably
shield insurers that act in bad faith.30 7 Courts will not allow insurers
to raise comparative fault and comparative bad faith as affirmative
defenses, 31 8 nor will they give related jury instructions, absent
evidentiary support.3° Insureds' meritorious bad faith claims will be
unaffected. In most bad faith actions these defenses will not be an
301. Livesay, supra note 23, at 1219.
302. Id.
303. Anderson, supra note 19, at 516; see also Livesay, supra note 23, at 1219
(noting that "[c]omparative bad faith restores fundamental fairness by shifting
responsibility back to insureds for their misconduct").
304. Richmond, supra note 23, at 61.
305. Id.
306. Several insurance law scholars have suggested that bad faith is properly
confined to contract law. See, e.g., Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Contractual
Good Faith In Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1235-36 (1994) (extension of tort doctrine
to contract disputes is unwarranted, especially when there are other means of remedying
the breach); Jerry, supra note 33, at 1342 (arguing that "tort law has infringed upon
contract law's rightful territory"); Robert H. Jerry, II, Remedying Insurers' Bad Faith
Contract Performance:A Reassessment, 18 CONN. L. REV. 271, 319-21 (1986) (arguing
that duty of good faith and fair dealing should be treated as a contract duty, but courts
should administer contract remedies more flexibly in insurance cases); William Powers
Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1229-31 (1994) (suggesting that tort duty of
good faith and fair dealing is inappropriate in the first-party context).
307. Richmond, supra note 23, at 60.
308. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Morrison Assur. Co., 600 So. 2d 1147,
1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 604 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1992).
309. See, e.g., Alexander Underwriters Gen. Agency, Inc. v. Lovett, 357 S.E.2d 258,
262-66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
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issue.3" ° Even in those cases in which the insured's conduct is
suspect, insurers may be reluctant to assert the defenses. Jurors'
general dislike for insurance companies, and the potential backlash that
attends insurers' reliance on frivolous affirmative defenses, will limit
insurers' use of comparative fault and comparative bad faith to those
cases in which the insured's wrongful conduct is substantial or
outrageous. At the same time, the defenses will discourage insureds
from pursuing bad faith litigation where the insured's conduct
or in which the insured's conduct
aggravated the underlying situation
311
materially contributed to the loss.
Fourth, comparative fault and comparative bad faith serve to
discourage insureds who might otherwise be tempted to set up their
insurers for bad faith claims. Judicial recognition of comparative fault
and comparative bad faith discourage insureds from filing frivolous
declaratory judgment or bad faith actions. Comparative fault and
comparative bad faith would thus restore some reason to today's
hostile insurance litigation climate, in which every bad faith and
declaratory judgment action is a potential bonanza for the insured.
These defenses also serve to penalize insureds who are pursuing
fraudulent claims, and who would otherwise profit from their deceit if
the insurer could not satisfy its burden of proof on a concealment or
fraud defense. 1 The economic benefit of combating or discouraging
insurance fraud cannot be disregarded; insurance fraud costs society
some 3$20
billion annually and it significantly increases premium
13
costs.

C. The Need to Recognize Reverse Bad Faith
To date, no appellate court has published a decision recognizing
reverse bad faith as a cause of action absent a statute conferring the
right to bring such a claim.314 That does not mean, however, that
insurers should give up on the idea of reverse bad faith or that such a
cause of action is not viable. As the Greater New York Mutual
Insurance Co. v. North River Insurance Co.315 court observed, "[a]n
insured should not have license to act in bad faith toward its

310. Anderson, supra note 19, at 519.
311. Livesay, supra note 23, at 1218.
312. Id. at 1219.
313 . Id. at 1219.
314. See, e.g., Adams v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 898 S.W.2d 216, 219
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying Tennessee statute).
315. 872 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 85 F.3d 1088 (3d Cir. 1996).
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insurer., 316 At the very least, the reciprocal duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in all insurance policies should entitle an insurer to
recover contract damages occasioned by its insured's bad faith.3 17
The strongest argument for recognizing a reverse bad faith cause of
action can be made where the insured commits fraud when making a
claim under a first-party policy. 31 1 In that situation, equity clearly
favors the insurer.3 9 The insurer must devote human resources and
expend capital to investigate and resolve a claim made solely to reap an
unfair and unintended economic windfall. The insurer must devote its
time and spend its resources on a claim attributable to a risk for which
it did not bargain. Such wrongful conduct by an insured should
support a compensatory damage award, and it may also justify a
punitive damage claim by the insurer.320
If an insured submits a fraudulent first-party claim and then sues the
insurer for bad faith when the claim is denied, a reverse bad faith cause
of action is practically mandated.321 Under these circumstances, the
insurer must bear the cost of defending the bad faith action and face
related damage exposure when it has already been forced to bear the
expense of adjusting the underlying claim. 322 Especially in situations
where the insurer may not be able to prove fraud or malicious
prosecution, it should be allowed to counterclaim for the tort actually
committed by the insured.
A powerful argument can also be made for recognizing a reverse
bad faith cause of action in those third-party cases in which the insured
or, more likely, the insured's assignee, sets up the insurer for a bad
faith claim. Here again the insurer must bear allocated adjustment
expenses for the underlying liability claim. The insurer must also bear
the cost of defending its insured in the underlying third-party action.
The insurer must defend the bad faith action knowing that it can spare
no defense-related expenses because of the threat of ruinous
extracontractual liability. Finally, the insurer is exposed to unearned
and unjustified extracontractual liability that may ultimately cause it to
settle other claims that it ought not, simply because of the lingering bad
faith threat. Any third-party bad faith claim that is "set up" should
entitle the insurer to both compensatory and punitive damages.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 1408.
Id.
Richmond, supra note 23, at 69.
Id.

320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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An insurer might also be justified in suing for reverse bad faith
where an insured sues for coverage under the policy knowing that the
underlying claim is not covered or where the insured reasonably
should have so known. This was, of course, the situation presented in
Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. v. United Capitol Insurance Co.3 23 While
this situation may not carry with it the threat of extracontractual
liability-assuming the insured simply seeks a declaratory judgment or
alleges a mere breach of contract-the insurer nonetheless has to spend
time and capital defending frivolous litigation.
In all of these scenarios the insured's power, wealth, sophistication,
and size are irrelevant. There is no need for preferential or protective
treatment. The focus in these situations comfortably and properly rests
on the insured's conduct and not on the insured's status.
D. Pleadingthe Insurer'sDefense or Claim
In most instances an insurer should have no difficulty pleading the
insured's comparative bad faith or comparative fault as an affirmative
defense. In federal courts and in those jurisdictions that allow notice
pleading, an insurer may allege one or both defenses very generally.
Indeed, an insurer may want to allege both defenses in order to make
sure it preserves a defense that will survive discovery and dispositive
motions. In fact-pleading jurisdictions, a defending insurer will have
to specify those facts on which the defenses are premised. A key
determinant regardless of the jurisdiction's pleading rules is the bad
faith standard against which the insured's conduct should be
measured. In those jurisdictions applying a negligence standard in bad
faith cases,3 24 the insurer probably should plead the insured's
comparative fault, rather than comparative bad faith.
In addition to pleading comparative bad faith and comparative fault,
a defending insurer should also be sure to plead related affirmative
defenses. Such affirmative defenses may include recoupment, setoff,
and breach of the policy's cooperation clause.
An insurer wishing to assert a reverse bad faith cause of action will
probably have to plead it as a counterclaim. In most instances, reverse
bad faith will be a compulsory counterclaim; the same nucleus of
operative facts giving rise to the insured's bad faith claim will form the
basis for the insurer's reverse bad faith allegations. In the first-party
context an insurer should allege (1) that the insured owes it a duty of
323. No. 91-22014 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris County, Dec. 30, 1994), reported in 9
MEALEY'S LITIG. REPORTS: INS. No. 10, H-I (Jan. 10, 1995). See supra notes 264-72 and

accompanying text.
324. See supra note 98.
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good faith and fair dealing as a party to the contract of insurance, (2)
that the insured breached the duty, specifying the insured's offending
conduct as best as it can be pleaded, and (3) that the insurer was
damaged as a result of the insured's breach. In third-party cases, the
insurer probably will be required to allege that, as an assignee, the
third-party claimant steps into the insured's shoes, thereby becoming
subject to all claims that might otherwise be made against the insured.
Insurers must be selective in raising the affirmative defenses of
comparative bad faith and comparative fault, and in asserting reverse
bad faith claims. Frivolous affirmative defenses are likely to anger
jurors, thus increasing the insurer's exposure instead of potentially
reducing the insurer's damages. Insurers opting to pursue reverse bad
faith claims must be able to point to particularly offensive conduct by
insureds in order to justify the expense associated with prosecuting
such a lawsuit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts' and juries' enforcement of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing inherent in every insurance policy has been decidedly
unilateral.3 25 Assuming the duty of good faith and fair dealing to be a
two-way street, as it truly is and was meant to be, why have insurers
not had greater success pleading insureds' bad faith as an affirmative
defense or as a separate cause of action?3 26 Part of the problem lies in
outmoded judicial notions of the insured-insurer relationship, and part
is probably attributable to insurers' reluctance to raise or rely on
largely untested legal theories in bad faith cases.327
Regardless of the source of existing doctrinal difficulties, travel on
the two-way street of good faith has been rough thus far.328 Much
329
work remains to be done before the street is truly open to insurers;
yet, there is no doubt that it should be. 33' Fairness and fundamental
legal principles require that work continue and that insurers' route be
cleared.33'
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